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This  study  aims  at  analysing  the  data  protection  measures  necessary  in  the  city  of
Turku’s bike system. The city of Turku, Finland, has launched a city bike service,
handled by the public transportation service ‘Föli’ and providing 300 bikes for rental
all over the city. This new city feature makes Turku attractive, easily discoverable,
eco-friendly and smart. For the purpose of this thesis, Turku is even considered as a
smart  city,  as  together  with  other  smart  services  the  city  bikes  allow  for  smart
transportation and enhances urban life.
Yet, as smart as the city can be, data protection should not be despised. The new
General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR), enforceable on May 25th 2018,
changes the rules for processing personal data and organisations are required to get
compliant with it. Compliance with the GDPR encompasses several aspects, both from
a technical and a legal point of view.
This thesis analyses Turku’s city bike system and particularly all the steps requiring
processing  of  personal  data.  This  paper  examines  the  possible  technical  risks,  the
actors involved and their liability under the GDPR, the applicable data protection
requirements as well as the possible solutions for a smooth processing of personal data.
The research has been made in concertation with Turku’s city bike system team with
the aim of identifying the legal steps necessary to this system for a lawful processing
of personal data.
Keywords: city bikes, GDPR, data protection, smart city, security, personal data
processing, consent, privacy
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 City bikes in the smart city trend
The first shared city bikes in Europe were launched in Copenhagen in 1995, and the
idea has ever since spread to 22 European countries and throughout the world.
Nowadays, most big cities in Europe are offering the bike service, which enables
citizens to easily rent a bike on an hourly fee, usually paid by credit card. The city bike
concept is fashionable, eco-friendly and is a major element in the smart city trend.
The aim and need of a smart city are public. All “smart” technologies and services
implemented by a smart city are designed to serve the city and all the people living
therein. The city bikes are no exception, and although their rental requires a small fee,
they belong to the smart city dynamic and the ambition to make the way of life in cities
smarter.
Although a smart city does not yet have a single definition, some are defining them by
the implementation of digital instruments capable of steering the way cities are
configured and managed1. In this interpretation, surveillance cameras, smart sensors,
smart meters and other smart networked and digital devices are the core of the smart
city. All these devices, main constituents of the Internet of Things (IoTs) collect real-
time data which the city uses to provide its services. The public devices are
supplemented by personal ones, such as smart phones and connected cars in order to
create an urban environment where every movement, action and condition is measured
and collected for further use. Others consider that these digital tools are promotors of
citizen-centric models, which aim at focusing on the citizen as the core element of the
city, encouraging civic engagement, developing better communication tools between
the government and the citizens in order for the latter to be heard.
1 Kitchin, R. (2016) Getting smarter about smart cities: Improving data privacy and data security. Data
Protection Unit, Department of the Taoiseach, Dublin, Ireland
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Some sceptical scholars like Townsend2 follow the  evolution  of  smart  cities  with  a
critical eye, fearing that all this information technology, “combined with the urban
infrastructure, architecture, everyday used objects and even our bodies” will only lead
to produce vulnerable, “buggy”, “brittle” and hackable systems. Information
technologies are not failure proof, and in particular in smart cities, one of the objects
at risk is personal data.
Yet, all definitions share the common idea that a smart city is a place where the
connection of digital devices and new technologies allow for a faster and a smoother
handling of all kinds of city-situations. These city-situations are all from faster medical
care, eco-friendly street lights and well-adapted transportation services, with no fuss.
The smart city concept is expected to make the urban life easier.
City bikes are an intelligent solution adopted by several cities to take a step further in
the smart revolution. Bikes facilitate citizens to move around quickly without any
carbon footprint. Copenhagen, in Denmark, has efficiently adopted Bycyklen, an
electric city bike the city is very proud of and which constitutes a core element in their
smart project3. Amsterdam, another main bicycle hub, is even taking a step forward by
launching FindMyBicycle: a paying GPS solution to be installed on private bikes, and
aiming at connecting all bikes together. With the installed device, each owner is able
to watch their bike through a mobile application. A simple, privately-owned bike
would ultimately become a smart bicycle,” capable of connecting with other smart
bicycles and smart cities' infrastructures, creating a system of bicycles.” 4 Hopefully,
such a system of bicycles would ultimately reduce bike thefts.
As  stated  above,  these  great  innovations  come  with  a  vulnerability,  namely  the
protection of personal data. Although city bikes are part of a public service, usually
offered by a public entity, their use require the process of personal data.
The protection of personal data is legally referred to as data protection and applies to
any information which relates to an identifiable or identified natural person. In Europe,
2 Townsend, A. (2013) Smart Cities: Big data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia
3 See Visit Copenhagen website and the bycyklen project, available at
http://www.visitcopenhagen.com/copenhagen/bycyklen-gdk495345
4 See Smart Amsterdam website and the FindMyBicycle project, available at
https://amsterdamsmartcity.com/products/find-my-bicycle
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the protection of such data has been enhanced with the adoption of the General Data
Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR), adopted on April 27th, 2016 and entering
into force on May 25th 2018. It sets the new rules for all processing of personal data
within the Union and repeals the previous data protection directive 95/46/EC. As a
regulation, the GDPR is directly applicable into the national laws; the member states
do not need to transcribe the laws into national ones apart for some exceptional
provisions which are subject to being transposed into national law. This direct
applicability facilitates its adoption in the member states, which need to reasonably
justify any divergence with it.
The GDPR has been developed as to fit the digital age and treats data protection as a
fundamental  right.  The  recital  of  the  GDPR  states  that  “the protection of natural
persons in relation to the processing of their personal data is a fundamental right”,
which  means  that  it  is  a  right “considered by a Court to be explicitly or implicitly
expressed in a Constitution […] [and which can only be limited] if there is a
compelling State interest.” as defined by the Meriam Webster Dictionary of Law. The
entitlement of “fundamental right” takes its roots from the article 8(1) of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which provides that “Everyone has the
right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her”, and from the article
16(1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union which states that
“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them”. The
protection of personal data should thus be prioritized when designing the structures
and the technologies of smart cities, in order to avoid any violation with citizens’
personal data.
This fundamental right to protection applies to personal data. In its article 4 (1), the
GDPR defines personal data as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person”. In fact, data gets linked to an identifiable person rather
quickly. For instance, it suffices that two sets of “anonymous” data be linked together
to transform the sum into personal data. For example, a name alone, like “Maria”, does
not easily lead to the identification of a person. But if “Maria” is linked to a birthday,
it becomes easier to identify this person, as the sum of these two strings of data narrows
down the amount of ‘Marias’ being born on that exact birthday. The more data is linked
together,  the easier it  is  to identify a person; and when the data allows to identify a
person, it is referred to as personal data.
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This works as well  for data not as obvious as names or birthdays.  An IP address as
such is not per se personal data - merely a set of numbers. However, when linked to
another set of information, such as the Internet Service Provider (ISP) used, the user’s
name or even the smartphone’s GPS location, the information becomes personal. As
stated by Lessig5:” The Web must know an IP address; ISPs require identification
before they assign an IP address to a customer. So long as the log records of the ISP
are kept, the transaction is traceable. Bottom line: If you want anonymity, use a pay
phone!”
The GDPR also receives considerable attention as it encompasses more personal data
than the superseded directive. The latter identifies a natural person “by reference to an
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity”; in comparison, the GDPR considers that
a natural person can also be identified by “a name”,  “an identification number”,
“location data”, “an online identifier” as well as “genetic” identity, on top of those
listed in the Directive. In that sense, the GDPR widens the sources of identifiers
requiring protection.
It is nonetheless important to keep in mind that it is not prohibited to use personal data
for a service. Many services do actually need to process personal data for a better and
more tailored activity. As a matter of fact, the whole smart city concept is based on the
usage of data on a real-time basis, Turku’s city bike system makes no exception. It is
not the personal data alone which is the main focus of the GDPR, but the way it  is
processed. As wide as the definition of personal data can be, the GDPR also englobes
a whole set of processing activities and provides rules for protecting personal data in
the event of it being processed. According to the article 4 (2), the processing of data
refers to “any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or
on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection,
recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.”
In addition, the GDPR also reforms the directive by adding another element, that is the
data user’s control over her personal data. The regulation strives for making the
5 See L.Lessig, Code 2.0 in the chapter “architecture of control”
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protection of personal data user-centred, and as clearly indicated in Recital 7, “natural
persons should have control of their own personal data”.
In theory, an individual’s personal data is not protected as soon as he or she steps
out in a public area, like into a street or a mall. What this individual does in the public
space, who he talks to and where he goes is all data that is not per se protectable6.
However, the processing of this data is regulated. In other words, as soon as the actions
of an individual walking in the street are recorded, it becomes protectable. The GDPR,
as described in the previous section, lists all the different kinds of operations
considered as “processing” and which gives the right to protect the processed data.
The smart city is by definition a huge producer of data. Many see data as the fuel of
the city of the future. As formulated in the Economist, “data are to this century what
oil was to the last one: a driver of growth and change7”. All kinds of data emanating
from all kinds of different sensors and monitors are of interest, and most importantly,
the data is real-time data. Data is therefore sensed all the time and most of it emanates
from the citizens themselves, as they connect to a public WIFI with their smartphone
or  their  laptop,  as  they  use  smart  parking  with  their  car  or  as  the  smart  street  light
senses pedestrians walking by. This thesis will attempt to identify the different
processing steps undertaken by Turku’s public transport service Föli and their
processors.
Daily,  large  amounts  of  data  are  produced  and  a  wide  amount  of  this  data  is
categorized as personal data. This data is to be duly protected against leaks or misuses
as it is inherent to each person’s privacy. Many are the organisations, companies and
even individuals unaware of the vulnerability of personal data and the right for
accurate protection, and usually measures are taken only once problems occur.
However,  when  the  data  is  out  it  might  be  too  late:  identity  theft  is  a  fact  and,  as
6 Lessig, Code 2.0




reported in Cifas’ 2018 report8, 175 000 cases of identity frauds were counted in 2017,
in 90% of which a victim’s home address had been used. It is an idea largely supported
by scholars: data protection works best if considered proactively.
As stated previously, the GDPR’s recital’s first sentence stresses the fact that the
protection of personal data is a fundamental right, with reference to the article 8(1) of
the Charter and to the article 16(1) of the TFEU. Data protection as a fundamental right
goes  along  with  the  right  to  privacy,  which  is  a  pillar  of  freedom  in  our  society.
Schneier, in his article ”The eternal value of privacy”9 considers  that  if  privacy  is
despised and personal data ignored, our very individuality is lost, ”because everything
we do is observable and recordable”.
The  city  of  Turku  starts  glowing  as  a  modern  city  in  full  smart-revolution.  The
initiative  to  launch  a  city  bike  project  in  the  city  is  one  of  the  smart  steps,  among
several others such as smart bus stops or ‘the Smart and Wise Turku’ project. The city
of Turku is, in the case of the city bikes, the controlling authority, however this control
is intended to switch to Föli in a couple of years. Föli is a public department in the city
of Turku which will for now operate the city bikes, and for these reasons the city of
Turku will hereinafter be referred to as Föli in this thesis.
 The city bike project aims at lending out city bikes to individuals for a small fee. The
bike is made available from bike stations, of which there are 34, situated throughout
the city of Turku. The whole city bike system is expected to count 300 bikes, to start
with. The lending time for each bike is limited to 5 hours, allowing the users to travel
from  one  point  to  another  within  the  city,  also  enabling  the  bikes  to  be  regularly
available for everyone wishing to rent one.
For facilitated management purposes as well as payment security and statistical
purposes, data is collected from the bike users, including personal data. Some data,
which initially does not constitute personal data, becomes personal after association
with other data, thus enabling the identification of a natural person. The city bike
8 Cifas Fraudscape 2018, available at:
https://www.cifas.org.uk/secure/contentPORT/uploads/documents/External-Fraudscape%202018-
Final.pdf
9 See Bruce Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, available at:
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2006/05/the_eternal_value_of.html , 2006
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project of Turku does therefore process personal data, making the GDPR applicable.
The regulation is also applicable as Turku, city of Finland, is located in the European
Union.
1.2 Research question and thesis structure
City bikes are obviously a trend adopted by more and more cities around the world.
But what the city bike systems fail to show to the public is the legal issues involved,
and in particular the data protection side. For billing and maintenance purposes, the
bike user’s personal data is required, such as her name, her address and her credit card
credentials. Usually, and at least in the case of Föli, the city bikes are equipped with a
GPS which could potentially track the movements of the users. In order to avoid
identity thefts and other misuses of personal data, as well as being in compliance with
the GDPR, it becomes crucial to consider data protection when designing or updating
the processing activities. It also becomes important to identify the different actors
involved in the system and their respective liability. Furthermore, the awareness of the
technical  risks  and  the  technical  solutions  is  essential  for  a  global  protection  of  the
personal data.
With the support of Turku’s city bike team, this thesis will attempt to answer to the
question: how is personal data processed in Turku’s city bike system and which legal
and technical requirements should be considered with regard to the GDPR?
This thesis will first analyse the technology and its application in the city bike system
(II). It will then identify the different actors involved (III), the GDPR requirements
applicable to Turku’s city bike system (IV) and finally the possible solutions for a
secure processing of personal data (V).
Meetings with the city bike team were organized approximately once a month and
provided me with a great understanding of the city bike system’s design, as well  as
raised legal questions I hope I was able to answer to in this thesis.
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II. THE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE
TURKU CITY BIKE SYSTEM
New technologies are the core of the smart city, the mechanism which makes it smart.
As it was made clear in several conferences in the Smart City Expo Barcelona10 in
2016, data in a smart city flows fast and is dependent on three main features: sensors,
cloud or server storage and a strong WIFI connection. The city bike project launched
by the city of Turku is dependent on the same tools, in addition with Bluetooth
connection used by the beacon technologies11. All these features have important risks
with regard to data protection, and these risks are substantially linked to the citizen’s
ability to give consent.
This section identifies the technologies used in the Föli bike services and the technical
risks linked therein. For instance, Föli’s bike system is composed of bikes, equipped
with  small  transmitters  called  beacons  to  which  connection  is  possible  through  a
smartphone. The smartphone also enables to pay for the bike and to get further
information on the Föli system.
2.1  The sensors involved in the project
Although the whole city bike project of Turku gravitates around bikes, there are a few
sensors involved in it. Despite the fact that they are necessary for the smooth running
of the bike system, they are also technologically weak compounds which need
particular attention, especially with regard to data protection.
10 In conferences such as:
∂ “Big data for more responsive and humane cities” with Josep Missé Cortina ;
∂ “Strategies to protect critical infrastructure and ensure digital safety” with Joe Paiva, Bernard
Ewah, Swadheen Kshatriya and Alfredo Pironti ;
∂ “Finding the balance between Privacy and Security”, with Eduardo Bohorquez, Victoria
Beltran and Mohamed Amin Hasbini
11 More information on the beacon technology available in section 2.1.2
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2.1.1 Sensors in the city are part of the Internet of Things movement
Before analysing the sensor technology, it is important to understand the dynamic it is
involved  in,  namely  the  Internet  of  Things  (IoT).  Although  it  is  quite  difficult  to
specifically define due to its broadness, the Internet of Things refers to the communion
of physical and digital characteristics aimed at creating novel products and services.
The concept is still under development and its value as a business opportunity is no
longer questioned: its value has even been estimated as to reach $7.1 trillion by 202012.
Usually,  the  novelty  adds  new  digital  software  to  an  old  physical  product.  As  an
example, let’s consider a lightbulb.  The primary function of the lightbulb would be to
be lit-up and to be switched off. If IOT technologies, such as a software programming,
were to be included in the design of the lightbulb, it would not only serve the purpose
of lighting up, but it could also detect movement and even have face-recognition
features.  From a simple lightbulb,  IoT could turn it  to be a security and an energy-
saving tool.
More and more services function through transfers of digital information. Those
transfers occur fast and on a real-time basis, between Internet-connected objects. These
objects can be computers, smartphones, watches, glasses, cars, fridges… Cisco
predicts that 50 billion devices will be connected to the Internet by 202013.
The enhancement of simple urban devices is very much what a smart city is about.
Following the same pattern as the lightbulb, most smart cities are attempting to identify
how traditional items could be turned into smart items.
The city of Barcelona gives an excellent example on a large implementation of IoT
throughout the city. As a matter of fact, Barcelona has already implemented a vast
number of sensors, especially placed on the street light poles. These sensors,
disseminated all over the city run on timers and detect movement – which is aimed at
reducing the energy consumption – but other than lightning up the streets they also
12F. Wortmann and K. Flüchter, Internet of Things Technology and Value Added, 2015, Springer
13 Dave Evans, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing,
Everything, 2011, Cisco, available at:
https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf
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enable gathering environment information and provide a free Internet access in the
city. 14
“Smart  waste”  is  another  example  of  large  implementation  of  IoT  in  the  city  of
Amsterdam. Among other projects, the city is installing new sensors in traditional
public trash bins, enabling the city to control and monitor remotely their location in
order to see where they need to be emptied, their security as well as their content. This
sensor is even able to provide rates and statistical data on each household’s
contribution to the trash bins15.
In Turku, the users’ smartphones, the beacons and the GPS devices installed on the
city bikes are all sensors capable of collecting and sending data. The smartphone, for
instance, can be used through the “Turku Public Transport Application” (the Föli app)
for payment and can also receive the information sent out by the beacon. The beacons
get connected to the smartphone by Bluetooth connection and enables the user to get
cultural and real-time information about the city. The GPS device facilitates a good
management  of  the  bikes  and  keeps  track  of  their  availability  throughout  the  city.
These features facilitate the use of the city bike project, both for the users as for the
managers.
With the city bikes, Turku signs up in a smart trend already adopted by several cities,
and it might only be the beginning in a large series of technical innovations.
Yet, connected devices are complex hardware which require special attention.
2.1.2 The connected devices: technical description
As analysed by Porter and Heppelmann16, all connected devices have in common three
elements: the physical element, the smart element and the connectivity element. The
physical elements are the tangible parts, such as the electric and the mechanical
components; the smart elements are the sensors, the microprocessors, the software, the
14 see Smart Barcelona on livingmap.com, available at: https://www.livingmap.com/smart-city/smart-
barcelona-its-all-about-people/
15 see Amsterdam Smart City and the smart waste city by citibrain, available at:
https://amsterdamsmartcity.com/products/smart-waste-citibrain
16 See Michael E. Porter, James E. Heppelmann, How smart, connected products are transforming
companies
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embedded operating systems, the digital user interface and the data storage solutions;
the connectivity elements are the ones enabling communication, such as antennas,
ports and networks. Together, all these elements allow for the Internet of Things and
Föli is using all of them.
In a smart city, the sensors play a crucial role as they are the means through which the
city can obtain real-time information from the citizens. usually a hardware which is
designed to capture an event; such as light, movement, temperature, touch or sounds;
to record it, and to respond to it. By the means of sensors, the citizens themselves can
also  transmit  data  to  the  city.  A  sensor  could  be  a  smart  light  bulb  which  detects
movement, as well as a feature on a smartphone.
The smartphone
The  smartphone  is  becoming  the  sensor  most  people  carry  along  with  them.  It  is
needed in the city bike project as a means of payment, a way of checking the free bike
station spots as well as the device through which the information from the beacon is
obtained. Defined by researchers 17as “a mobile phone that offers more advanced
computing ability and connectivity than a contemporary basic feature phone”, it
produces a lot of data. However only the sensor data is of interest in this section.
The smartphone produces and collects sensor data through the following hardware: the
camera and the microphone, the GPS sensor, the accelerometer and the gyroscope, the
magnetometer (digital compass) as well as a proximity sensor18. All these sensors’ aim
is to measure the exact location of the device, its orientation, the way it is moving and
its heading location. By device, it is naturally the smartphone user who is the source
of the movement.
In Turku, the bike user might use its smartphone as a mean of payment, through the
application “Turku Public Transport”, commonly named the “Föli app” and operated
by PayIQ Oy.  The application might also detect the GPS location of the closest bike
stations and their bike parking availability.
17 W. Jeon , J. Kim , Y. Lee , and D. Won, ”Practical analysis of Smartphone Security”, 2011
18 M. Theoharidou, A. Mylonas, D. Gritzalis, A Risk Assessment Method for Smartphones
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The beacons
Each bike will carry along a beacon. A beacon is a small device which transmits
information via Bluetooth to a smartphone or a similar mobile device on a range of
approximately 50 meters19. Already implemented in 170 buses in Turku, the beacons
situated on the bikes will allow the user to connect and get information on the history
of  Turku,  its  cultural  events  and  happenings  as  well  as  general  information  on  the
weather forecast. Some of the information will be drafted and made available by high
school students.
The bike’s GPS
Each bike is also carrying around a GPS sensor. This sensore nables the operator
Nextbike Polska S.A to quickly locate the bikes for maintenance and management
purposes. By knowing the bike’s location, it becomes easy to monitor an equal
provisioning of bikes on every station. This GPS, being attached to the bike, only refers
to the bike’s location. However, as for the smartphone, the device usually has a user;
it goes the same for the bike. The bike user, by choosing the bike and paying for it,
gets  registered  with  the  bike.  Although  the  user  cannot  use  the  GPS  as  such,  the
possibility to track the bike’s location thus enables to track the user.  The GPS
information is obtained through satellite. The navigation compound receives GPS
satellite signals, determines its position relative to the surface of the earth and the result
is read in the form of latitude and longitude.
2.2 Sensors’ security environment and the risks linked therein
Sensors have a huge role today in the Internet of things and in the development of
smart  cities.  Although  their  purpose  is  to  be  smart,  their  design  might  not  be.  Bad
design and the ability for remote connections make sensors fragile technologies
vulnerable to attacks.
2.2.1 Weak design
Sensors appear to be complex small computers designed for the very purpose they are
used for. Embedded devices are presenting many vulnerabilities, caused by weak
design that could invite attacks on the system.
19 Definition taken from www.webopedia.com ,  “the online tech dictionary for students, Educators
and IT professionals”
13
The wide and growing implementation of sensors in our everyday life is subject to a
vivid debate. Arguing are the tech fanatics, excited about all the advantages the sensors
bring; and the others, concerned about the risks sensors could carry along.
Embedded devices are usually cheap to produce and usually security has not been the
priority during the design-phase. The difficulty to evaluate the designed level of
security of embedded devices makes it very hard to guarantee secure systems20,
leading us to install unsecure sensors in our systems. This mass-spread adoption in
increasing parts of our daily lives is criticized among scholars.
Townsend21 is specialized in smart cities and keeps a very sceptical eye on the use and
the spread of sensors and other technical tools around the city.  In his opinion, their
massive spread might cause the downfall of the smart cities as these technologies
produce “buggy, brittle and hackable systems”,  as they might be designed from the
very beginning with defaults. He adds that even though their code is flawless, smart
cities will finally collapse as they will become too complex and will occasion accidents
for which the size of the consequences is yet to measure. Schneier is of the same
opinion22 as Townsend and sees no good way of coping with the embedded systems’
vulnerabilities.
2.2.2 Possible attacks
Although it is difficult to know whether sensors were by design faulty, most of them
are weak compounds, with very little or no embedded security measures, and thus easy
targets for attacks. Research23 has for instance been made on the “zero-permission”
sensors, which analyses the risk for unintentional leakage of personal data through
embedded sensors in smartphones. The zero-permission sensors, accessible without
20 M. Vasilevskaya and S. Nadjm-Tehrani, ”Quantifying Risks to Data Assets Using Formal Metrics
in Embedded System Design”, 2015, available at:
https://www.ida.liu.se/labs/rtslab/publications/2015/Vasilevskaya_Nadjm-
Tehrani_RisksToDataAssets.pdf
21 Townsend, Anthony M.,”Smart cities: big data, civic hackers, and the quest for a new utopia”, W.
W. Norton, 2013
22 B. Schneier, ”The internet of things is wildly insecure — and often unpatchable”, Opinion, Wired
magazine, 2014
23 D. Berend, B. Jung, S. Bhasin, ”There Goes Your PIN: Exploiting Smartphone Sensor Fusion
Under Single and Cross User Setting”, 2017
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the user’s permission, can thus be hacked by an attacker without the user’s knowledge,
leading to the leakage of personal identification numbers (PIN) and movement
patterns, leading to behavioural profiling, the recovery of the user’s PIN codes and
geo-localization.
Transduction attacks also refer to the weak design of the embedded devices and many
researches warn for the risk they are to privacy.  Transduction attacks aim at
manipulating the physical properties of devices. As a consequence, sensors and
embedded devices stop functioning the way they should. The behaviour of the sensor
is manipulated, and whatever the information it is supposed to obtain or give out is
changed. For example, a test was made on a Tesla car where its obstacle sensor was
attacked, and thus mislead the driver on the real distance to the obstacle24.
It remains difficult to forecast whether the systems set in place in the city of Turku
will be victim of attacks such as those described in this section. However, the goal
should not be to observe whether attacks have occurred, but to prevent them. Risk
prevention starts by awareness and is completed by technical measures such as
regular updates of the sensors software (applicable to the bikes’ GPS system and the
beacons). The smartphone users could also disable their sensors while making
sensitive operations with their smartphone, when for example checking their bank
account.
2.2.3 Loss or theft of devices
As an addition to the technical security of the embedded devices, all the other
components of the IoT present security risks. Although they will not all be analysed in
this  thesis,  the  risk  of  loss  or  theft  of  devices  is  worth  mentioning,  as  well  as  its
implication on the protection of personal data. In the event that a Föli employee’s work
computer is  stolen,  what are the risks that personal data from bike users gets in the
wrong hands?
24 K. Fu and W.Xu, ”Risks of trusting the physics of sensors; Protecting the Internet of Things with
embedded security” Communications of the ACM, feb.2018, vol. 61, n.2
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2.3 Basic security features
The risks announced in the previous sections are just a glimpse on what the city bike
project could risk with its technical infrastructure. A proper risk analysis by security
experts would be much more thorough and applicable. However, some basic security
features could be taken into account without having identified all the technical risks
involved in the bike project.
2.3.1 Updates
All software and hardware tools should be regularly updated. Updating is important,
as an old system becomes obsolete and technically weak with time and thus more
easily hackable by attackers.
2.3.2 Encryption
As a palliative to the weakness of the sensors, one solution could be to encrypt all the
data emanating from the devices. Encryption is a way of encoding and protecting
information so that only the legitimate parties can access the data, and is considered as
“appropriate safeguards”, together with pseudonymisation [article 6 GDPR]. Without
the encryption key, the information shows as gibberish. Encrypting the data is widely
used for civilian purposes and is considered as a basic security tool. As stated by the
founder of Crypto Party Harlem25, “an unencrypted internet-connected app or webtool
[is like] a window without curtains”, meaning that anyone could theoretically see what
data this is about.
There exist three different methods of encryption: hashing, symmetric encryption and
asymmetric encryption.
The password hashes
The hashing method consists in creating a unique signature, a “hash”, for one
data-set. As perfectly explained by the professor Gideon Samid26, the created hash is
in one way only, making it impossible to go backwards from the hash to the data-set.
For example, if the content is “abc1234”, the hash might be “45fg”.
25 Matthew Mitchell, founder of the security training organization ’Crypto Party Harlem’. More
information on crypto parties available at: https://www.cryptoparty.in/
26 Professor Gideon Samid from the University of Maryland and Chief Technology Officer at BitMint.
His lecture on hashing “Hashing: Why and How?” is available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yXmNmckX4sI&t=185s
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This signature is sometimes called ‘digital signature’ or even ‘digital fingerprint’. As
this number is unique, any change to the data-set radically alters the signature. The
signature  is  thus  like  a  sum up  to  what  is  in  the  data-set;  if  the  data-set  is  changed
somewhere, for instance if a letter is changed in the title, the hash is going to show
completely differently.
For example,  if  “abc1234” is modified to become “bbc1234”, the hash
might become “aaa8”.
The idea with the hashing encryption is to obtain a signature number which identifies
the original data-set and authenticates it. Hashing does not per se hide the data-set, but
will show if there are errors in the data-set or if the data-set has been modified by a
hacker.
For example, Alice has a file and generates a hash based on this file. Bob claims that
he has the same file. Because Alice is sceptical, she asks Bob to hash his file and to
show the obtained signature. If the hash obtained by Bob is the same as Alice’s, then
the two documents are the same.
One main advantage with hashing is that an attacker cannot recover the content of the
data-set  by  using  a  hash.  Password  hashing  is  therefore  a  perfect  tool  to  use  when
building a password-based protection, and specifications such as SHA-256 and SHA-
51227 seem to be the best.
Symmetric encryption
Symmetric encryption, or single-key encryption, might be the most commonly known
method of encryption.  A perfect example is the use of a password on a word
processing document. The idea is to encrypt the data-set with an algorithm, and to
create a decrypting key. As easily as a key opens a door, the key decrypts the data-sets
and allows for the recipient to access the content. Both the sender and the receiver
27 More detailed information on the different hash functions explained in the article “Hardware
implementation analysis of SHA-256 and SHA-512 algorithms on FPGAs”, by I. Ahmad and S. Das,
2005
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share the same key as there is only one key which allows for decryption. This system
is a basic encryption method easily performed.
Asymmetric encryption
The  asymmetric  encryption,  or  public  key,  functions  on  the  same  basis  as  the
symmetric encryption apart from the fact that two different and mathematically linked
keys are used: one for encrypting the data-set, and one for decrypting it. The sender,
encrypting the file, uses one key, and the receiver, decrypting it, uses the other, making
this whole process a little bit more secure than the symmetric version.
2.3.3 Storing passwords
One of the most basic security features independent of any technology is the storing
of passwords. Passwords are keys which enable access to a protected content, and
might be used internally in the organisation, as well  as by the users.  All  passwords,
including the ones chosen by the users to access their user portal, do possibly have to
be stored by the organisations. And it goes without saying that this storage has to be
very secure.
There are several different methods of storing password and the different operating
systems seem to all have their own storing system. However, there are a few tips28 on
how not to  store  passwords:  First,  passwords  should  never  be  stored  in  the
organisation’s system in plain text in an unencrypted excel file, as this would be
facilitating the job for potential hackers! Second, symmetric encryption is not either
recommended,  nor  is  hashing  surprisingly,  as  many users  have  the  same passwords
(such as ‘12345’ or ‘Password1’) which then generate the same hash! This is also the
reason for choosing a very secured password, preferably based on letters, numbers and
signs.
28 These recommendations were excellently presented by Tom Scott on the channel ‘Computerphile’,
available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4b8ktEV4Bg&t=393s
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Password managing companies29 do in practice store passwords by ‘hashing with salt’
and this method is also widely recommended among scholars30.   Hashing  with  salt
implies that a random and different string of characters is produced for every single
user, thus making it impossible to guess similar passwords.
For example, even though two users have the same passwords ‘12345’,
they will both be hashed with salt differently, on being hashed into
‘78gfd’ and the other into ‘34sir’.
The hashing with salt method therefore allows an organisation to store the usernames
next to their password, making it very impractical for hackers to access the ‘real’
password behind the hash.
Embedded devices are being widely adopted and installed, both on the city scale
as on the private side. Their use facilitates many services and changes them, making
them faster and more personalized. The city bikes of Turku are using embedded
services for a smooth management, both for the users as for the service providers.
However, sensors have shown technical vulnerabilities which could threaten the whole
systems with attacks and theft of data. As countermeasures, it appears important to be
aware of these threats and react accordingly by regularly updating the systems and
encrypting the data issued by the sensors, as well as storing all data securely with a
secure hashing with salt method.
29 Password managers such as Dashlane, Sticky Password and Password Boss
30 M. C. Ah Kioon, Z. Wang, S.Deb Das, Security Analysis of MD5 algorithm in Password Storage,
Applied Mechanics and Materials Vols. 347-350 (2013) pp 2706-2711, 2013
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III. THE CITY BIKE ACTORS, ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE GENERAL DATA
PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR)
The actors involved in the use and the smooth management of Turku city bikes are
several, and stretch from the very bike manufacturer to the user. This section aims at
listing all the actors involved in the city bike project, at identifying their production of
data (personal and non-personal) and their share of responsibility on personal data
protection.
3.1 Architectural description of Turku’s city bike service
This section studies the different actors involved in the city bike project, from the user
to the manufacturer.
3.1.1 The bike user
The bike user is  the most important source of personal data as it  directly refers to a
natural person. It is therefore important to have a thorough overview over all the data
collected from her, either as given voluntarily or as collected through other services.
In order to use the rental bike, the user needs to pay a small fee. To access the service
and pay, either performed on the internet, through the Föli smartphone application or
in the Föli customer office, the user needs to provide her name, her date of birth, her
address and her bank account number. These sets of information constitute personal
information which requires thoughtful protection in line with the GDPR. The bike gets
accessible once the user validates its payment method.
3.1.2 Föli
∂ Föli as a controller
Föli  is  the controller in the city bike service.  According to the article 4(7) GDPR, a
controller means “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body
which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data […]”
Föli is at the head of the city bike service and launched the project. It is designing the
service, and decides what information is required from the users for a smooth running
20
of the service and for the billing system. Föli sets the means of collection of the users’
data and is sole liable towards the users. Föli is in fact the only body running a feedback
system and having any exchange with the bike users.
∂ Föli as a processor
Föli does also wear the processor cap. A processor is being defined under article 4(8)
GDPR as” a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which
processes personal data on behalf of the controller”.
Föli is collecting the users’ personal data and their biking route information from
different sources. This information is for the most becoming personal data once
transferred to Föli from different service providers. The manufacturing and
maintenance company Nextbike Polska S.A is for instance providing Föli with the
exact GPS information for every bike. The ticketing system Init, ensuring that the user
can pay for a bike with its chosen payment method, provides Föli with the card ID of
each user having used a bike. Put together, the GPS information linked to the user
name  give  the  ability  to  know who took which bike, where and at what time. Föli
collects all this data, stores it and might come to analyze it. These actions are
processing activities and makes Föli a processor.
3.1.3 The service providers
A total number of six (6) service providers are involved in the city bike rental service.
∂ Nextbike Polska S.A
Nextbike Polska S.A, is a Polish company specialized in self-service city bikes. They
design and manufacture the bikes and their service includes the maintenance of the
bikes and the management of their location in the city of Turku. They are thus liable
for repairs and fixing flat tires, as well as making sure that a relatively equal number
of bikes can be found on all the 34 stations available in Turku. Their service
comprehends the design, manufacture and maintenance of the bike racks. Their service
is enabled through maintenance vans and GPS trackers, located on every single bike.
The GPS tracker allows for fast and accurate localization of the bikes and facilitates
counting them and organizing their location. The station alone has no intelligence.
In the event that a bike has been damaged on purpose, Nextbike Polska S.A could
request compensation from the author of the damages, and would in this case need to
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access the user’s name and contact information. This would lead to a transaction of
personal data between Föli and Nextbike Polska S.A which needs to be duly reported
in their terms and agreements, as well as in the report of processing activities [article
30 GDPR]
∂ Init31
Init is a ticketing service provider in charge of the ticketing system over all the Föli
network. It is functioning in all the buses and is to be operational for the city bikes as
well. Init’s ticketing system is based on the user card’s ID. The card ID only provides
information about the user’s account, which is a number. This number, needed for the
management of the bus or bike trips, is stored and managed in real time in the back-
office system.
However, once this number is transferred to Föli, it becomes personal data as it gets
connected to the user’s information connected to the account number. As stated on
their website, Init might come to process personal data when establishing an identity
and secure verifications. For these reasons, they are to be considered as processors.
∂ Western systems
Western systems are a Finnish software company providing Föli with several services
inherent to the city bike renting project. By their services, they collect mass amounts
of data concerning the bike users, such as their name, the time spent on the bike… All
this data is stored in the same storage as Föli’s. Föli can therefore access this personal
information. By collecting and storing this data, Western systems is processing it and
is thus considered as a processor according to the article 4(8) of the GDPR. Western
System have access to the whole Föli system, write its code and maintain it, it is
therefore very important that a record is kept between Föli and Western Systems on
all the processing activities.
∂ Nets
Nets is the payment system used by Föli to charge the bike users when they load money
through their bank account. Payment can be performed in different ways: either with
loaded money by bank card on the user’s bus card; or with the user’s phone number
31 More information on INIT available at: https://www.initse.com/ende/news-events/knowledge-
database/articles/2016/initiative02-turku.html
22
and PIN code (this latter method requires previous registration and payment with
Western Systems). Nets’ system operates the same security as bank transactions. It
assures that money is transferred from the user’s bank account to Föli’s. It charges the
users according to their wished amount, and makes this ”payment credit” available on
their Föli card. The activities undertaken by Nets make them a processor. Any cash
transaction will not be undertaken by Nets but by Init.
∂ PayIQ app
The Pay IQ app is a mobile payment solution used by Föli to provide their users with
a “Föli app”. This application enables a secured payment to Föli’s transport services,
including the city bikes. The service is cloud-based. The Pay IQ company providing
the service is processing personal data through its software product, which makes it a
processor with regard to the GDPR. However, some delay in the implementation of
the service makes this analysis difficult, in addition to the fact that Pay IQ might even
be considered as controllers as they have their own customer registry.
∂ Globeon
Globeon is a Finnish company producing beacons and are subcontractors to Föli’s
marketing company Ulkomainosyhtiö Laulava Ovipumppu Oy. In the city bike case,
Föli provides Globeon with a physical support to the small devices, namely the bikes:
each bike carries one beacon. Globeon collects and stores the data emitted by the
beacons and the information providing from the connecting Bluetooth. The service
provided by the beacons is not necessary for the bike service as such and is not under
the control of Föli, apart from the information that is transmitted through them.
Globeon is responsible for the technology and its updates, and therefore they are their
own controller. Föli is thus not liable for any incident that would occur through the
beacon technology, and this should be made clear in the contract between Globeon and
Föli.
3.2 Controller and processors’ liability in accordance with the GDPR
Turku’s city bike service involves several actors, Föli being the controller and for the
others being for the most processors. The processor is, as much as the controller, bound
by the legal requirements of the GDPR. The GDPR does provide how the relationship
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between controller and processor has to be organized, as well as all parts of
responsibility towards the regulation.
3.2.1 The relationship controller/processor
The controller is, according to the article 4(7) GDPR the authority determining the
purposes  and  the  means  of  the  processing  of  the  personal  data.  By  this  duty,  the
controller is also choosing the bodies processing the personal data on its behalf. The
controller might indeed need other actors’ services for the collection or the storage of
the personal data; these actors are defined by the GDPR as processors.
The article 28 GDPR provides with the legal requirements for the relationship between
the controller and the processor.
∂ The processor is bound to the controller by contract
According to the article 28(3) GDPR, the processor and the controller are to be bound
by contract,  in  which  the  processor’s  activities  have  to  be  well  defined.  The  article
provides that “processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other
legal act under the Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with
regard to the controller and that sets out the subject-matter and [the] duration of the
processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and
categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller”.
By this contract, the processor agrees to process the personal data “only on
documented instructions from the controller” [article 28(3)(a) GDPR], and to ensure
that “persons authorized to process the personal data have committed themselves to
confidentiality or are under an appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality”
[article 28(3)(b) GDPR]
As to be compliant with the GDPR, Föli  is  therefore obliged to draft  contracts with
each of its processors taking into account these mentioned points.
∂ The controller can only use processors compliant with the GDPR
Although bound by contract, the controller needs to ensure that it is solely using
processors compliant with the GDPR. As stated by the article 28 (1) GDPR, “where
processing is to be carried out on behalf of a controller, the controller shall use only
processors providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet the requirements
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of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject.” In other
words, the controller cannot choose anybody to process personal data, but needs to
make sure that the chosen processor will follow its instructions and process data in
accordance with the GDPR.
By pointing out in detail the elements to be included in the contract between processors
and  controllers,  the  article  28  of  the  GDPR  does  not  only  give  liability  to  the
processors, but also to the controller. While the processor performs the processing
tasks, the controller is legally bound to dictate the processing activities and monitor
the good compliance with the regulation.
In the situation at hand, Föli is to monitor the processing of personal data involved in
the city bike project, and overview all the activities undertaken by its subcontractors.
3.2.2 The legal requirements incumbent on the controller
The GDPR provides with several obligations incumbent on the controller alone.
∂ The contract and the record of processing activities
As mentioned in the previous section, the controller has to choose a processor
compliant with the requirements set out in the GDPR. Once chosen, it has to draft a
contract defining in detail the handling of the personal data. The controller will be the
sole authority instructing the processor on the processing activities.
The article 30 GDPR also directs the controller and the processor to keep a record of
the processing activities, listing what personal data is processed, how and by whom,
as well as the contact details to the controller and the processor.
∂ Guarantor for a lawful processing of personal data
Alone, the controller has the liability to guarantee compliance of the processing
activities with the GDPR. The article 5(2) states that “the controller shall be
responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1”, namely
the five principles relating to the processing of personal data32.  For  this  purpose,  it
shall implement measures and tools so that it can ensure and demonstrate this
compliance.
32 See section 4.1.2
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The article 24 (1) GDPR states that “taking into account the nature, scope, context
and purposes or processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for
the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that
processing is performed in accordance with this Regulation. Those measures shall be
reviewed and updated where necessary.”
On the grid of liability, the controller is placed above the processor. This article gives
the controller additional obligations incumbent to itself, as it should be able to prove
that all processing of data is performed in accordance with the GDPR and protects
personal data.
o Appropriate technical and organisational measures
To  counter  the  level  of  risks  and  ensure  a  safe  processing  of  personal  data,  the
controller shall ensure compliance with the GDPR by implementing “appropriate
technical and organisational measures” [article 24 GDPR]. In other words, it is the
controller’s  responsibility  to  adopt  and  decide  the  way  the  personal  data  will  be
handled. The Recital 78 provides with more explanation on the notion of “appropriate
measures” by stating that “such measures could consist, inter alia, of minimizing the
processing of personal data, pseudonymizing personal data as soon as possible,
transparency with regard to the functions and processing of personal data, enabling
the data subject to monitor the data processing, enabling the controller to create and
improve security features.”
The list is non-exhaustive and reviews and updates should be considered very
seriously, as stated in the article 24.
Föli, being the controller in the city bike project, should always be aware of what kind
of personal data is processed, what way and for how long. It should keep in mind
possible updates and systems to improve the security for the processed data.
o Assessment of the risks
The possible risks and the likelihood of these risks for the rights and freedoms of the
data subjects should be evaluated. This evaluation needs to be performed in order to
implement the right measures corresponding to the level of the risk. Undeniably, the
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existence of a risk and its severity are to be considered when defining the responsibility
of the controller and the measures to be adopted for the processing of the personal data.
It is up to the controller to assess the risk.
The Recital 75 provides with examples on the possible risks which may result from
personal data processing. The list is long and covers all kinds of damages, physical,
material and non-material, such as “where data subjects might be deprived of their
rights and freedoms or prevented from exercising control over their personal data” or
“where personal aspects are evaluated, in particular analysing or predicting aspects
concerning performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences or
interests, reliability or behavior, location or movements, in order to create or use
personal profiles”.
The risks’ severity can vary from very high to low. Where a type of processing is likely
to result  in a high risk,  the GDPR states that  the controller should carry out a “data
protection impact assessment” [article 35 (1) GDPR]. The high-risk processing
activities are those using new technologies, systematic and extensive evaluation or
personal aspects relating to natural persons which is based on automated processing;
processing on large scales of special categories of data, such as, i.a., genetic data or
data revealing ethnic origin; and the activities requiring systematic monitoring of a
publicly accessible area on a large scale.
The processing activities of Föli do not appear to include any high-risk processing
activities, and do not either present a high risk to the rights and freedoms of the data
subjects. However, personal data are processed by Föli, although they are not “special
categories” of data; still they require careful attention and adapted security measures
such as encryption, safe storage and data minimization33.
3.2.3 The legal requirements incumbent both on the controller and on the
processor
Together with the processor, the controller shall ensure that all necessary measures are
adopted to guarantee a sufficient level of security for the personal data.
33 The possible solutions for secured data processing methods are analysed in the chapter V.
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As provided by the article 32 GDPR, “Taking into account the state of the art, the
costs of implementation and the nature, the scope, the context and the purposes of
processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and
freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the processor shall implement
appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of security
appropriate to the risk.”
The risk having been evaluated, the controller shall then ensure that the processor has
implemented enough measures and tools for a secure processing of the personal data.
It shall also make sure that the tools are regularly updated, and that the processing
instructions are followed and respected by any person acting under the authority of the
processor.
The pseudonymisation and the encryption of personal data, the testing of the
effectiveness of the technical and the organisational measures, the ability to ensure
confidentiality and resilience of the processing systems and the ability to provide with
a backup to personal data in the event of a physical or technical incident are all
measures provided in the article 32 GDPR as appropriate for secure processing.
According to this article, they should be taken into account both by the processor and
by the controller.
In the city bike project, the data becomes personal once it reaches Föli’s databases, as
Föli combines all the data belonging to one data subject. GPS data, previously only
showing a route, is in Föli’s database put together with the identity of the user. It is
therefore very important that Föli’s internal system provides with the best security
features, that these features are regularly tested and updated and that the data contained
in Föli’s servers is protected.
3.2.4 The legal requirements incumbent on the processor
The processor processes personal data on behalf of the controller. As presented above,
the relationship between the controller and the processor is governed by a contract,
which should stipulate “the subject-matter and the duration of the processing, the
nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data
subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller.” [article 28 (3) GDPR]
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∂ Approved code of conducts and certification
The processors used by Föli should provide with sufficient guarantees as to ensure that
all  data  processing  follows  the  requirements  of  the  GDPR [article 28 (1) GDPR].
Although  it  is  Föli’s  obligation  as  a  controller  to  make  sure  their  processors  are
compliant with the regulation, the processors need to follow certain rules.
As referred to in the article 28 (5) GDPR, processors can demonstrate compliance with
the regulation by adhering to approved code of conducts or approved certification
mechanisms. These approved codes of conducts and certifications are based on
international standards and are issued by certification bodies, as specified in the article
43 GDPR. IAPP34 for instance organizes exams accrediting GDPR certifications to
organisations.
In the bike project, none of the processors have adhered to an approved code of conduct
or to an approved certification relevant to the GDPR. However, some have a privacy
policy which ensures the protection of personal data. Pay IQ 35 has a code of conduct
and a privacy policy but there is made no mention of the GDPR. Nets 36 are aware of
the GDPR and they ensure compliance with the Regulation, however without having
an official GDPR certification. Nextbike Polska s.a 37does also have a privacy policy,
but it does not mention the GDPR. Init38 has a privacy policy, listing all the possible
event where they might process personal data. Western Systems are in the course of
drafting theirs.
∂ Process based on documented instructions from the controller
Based on the article 28(3)(a) GDPR, the processor shall “process the personal data
only on documented instructions from the controller”. It is thus tied to respect these
instructions, and it could be held liable if they were not respected.
34 IAPP refers to the International Association of Privacy Professionals, more information available at:
https://iapp.org/
35 Pay IQ’s privacy policy available at https://payiq.net/en-us/pol_privacy.html
36 Nets’” privacy policy” or GDPR page, available at https://www.nets.eu/Pages/GDPR.aspx
37 Nextbike Polska S.A’s privacy policy available at https://nextbike.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/Privacy-Policy-Nextbike-Polska-S.A..pdf
38 Init’s privacy policy available at https://www.initse.com/ende/us/footer-meta/privacy-policy.html
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This article also provides Föli, as a controller, with the obligation of indicating all
processing instructions to the processors working in their behalf.
∂ Removal of personal data
The article (article 28(3)(g)) also provides the processor with the obligation to delete
or return all the personal data to the controller after the end of the provision of services
relating to processing. This obligation implies good organisational measures from the
processor’s side in order to be able to retrieve all the data in a timely manner.
Turku’s city bike system is controlled by Föli and englobes six other players
acting as processors. Both the controller and the processors have defined
responsibilities towards the GDPR so that personal data is processed lawfully and in
accordance with its original purpose.
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IV. THE GDPR REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO FÖLI’S CITY
BIKES
4.1 The notion of “processing”
The notion of processing is at the heart of the GDPR. It encompasses a wide range of
activities and the controller needs to follow defined rules in order to make the
processing lawful.
Processing personal data is what the GDPR is all about and as such, it considers
protecting the processing of personal data as a fundamental right. The regulation
therefore frames all the processing activities by defining them, as well as the actors
performing the processing. The article 4 is aimed at defining all the notions inherent
to the protection of personal data, and states in the paragraph 4 that processing “means
any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of
personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording,
organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available,
alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.”
This article encompasses what seems to be all the activities which could be performed
with data, sometimes at the great desperation of the IT professionals. In general, the
GDPR provides with stricter rules than previous data protection tools. The idea is
however pretty simple: as soon as personal data concerning a natural person is handled
by someone else than the data subject, this handling, or “processing” should follow the
requirements of the GDPR.
The processed data should belong to a living natural person [recital 27]. The text also
makes clear that the natural person could be of any nationality and reside anywhere,
even outside the EU [recital 14], and that the data holder should be identifiable [recital
26]. The regulation is not applicable to the processing of data concerning legal persons
[recital 14]. The processing of personal data needs to have a connection with
professional or commercial activity, without which it is considered as personal activity
and therefore not covered by the regulation.
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The city bike project controlled by Föli consists of processing personal data concerning
natural persons, namely names, home addresses, phone numbers, bank account details
and GPS locations, as it involves the personal data of the bike users being collected
through several means; them being stored; possibly consulted from time to time and
likely erased after a set period of time. These reasons lead to affirming that the GDPR
is applicable and should be respected by Föli and all the processors involved in the city
bike project.
4.2 The features for lawful processing
The notion of processing within the GDPR is particularly framed. Two articles refer
to it, namely the article 5, which states the principles relating to processing of personal
data, and the article 6 determining the lawfulness of processing activities.
The article 5 states six processing principles:
4.2.1 Fair and transparent processing
The first paragraph of the article 5 provides that “personal data shall be processed
lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject”. The notion
of fair processing is already a fundamental right with regard to the article 8(2) of the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and as referred to in the Directive 95/46/EC.
However, it goes differently with the notion of transparency, which is merely
mentioned in the recital of the repealed Directive. However, the notion of transparency
is much stronger in the new regulation and could even be considered as a requirement.
Although no legal definition is made of the notion, the recital designs it as: “It should
be transparent to natural persons that personal data concerning them are collected,
used, consulted or otherwise processed and to what extent the personal data are or
will be processed. The principle of transparency requires that any information and
communication relating to the processing of those personal data be easily accessible
and easy to understand, and that clear and plain language be used. That principle
concerns, in particular, information to the data subjects on the identity of the
controller and the purposes of the processing and further information to ensure fair
and transparent processing in respect of the natural persons concerned and their right
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to obtain confirmation and communication of personal data concerning them which
are being processed39…”
The idea of transparency appears as a logical suite of the user-centred principle held
by the GDPR, i.e.  the natural persons and data subjects should have control over their
personal data. Transparency would give control, as the data subjects would know by
whom and for what purpose the data concerning them is used.
The  Article  29  Working  Party  (hereinafter  WP  29)  identifies40 three areas of
application of the principle of transparency. Shall be transparent “(1) the provision of
information  to  data  subjects  related  to  fair  processing;  (2)  how  data  controllers
communicate with data subjects in relation to their rights under the GDPR; and (3)
how data controllers facilitate the exercise by data subjects of their rights”.
Transparency refers to the way communication with the data subject is handled, and
therefore all information inherent to the processing of personal data needs to be easily
obtained. The article 12 GDPR provides that the information relating to processing
should be given to the data subject:
∂ In a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear
and plain language;
∂ Free of charge;
∂ In writing, by electronic means when appropriate, and even orally, if requested
so by an identified data subject
As an example, the data protection WP 29 identifies in its guidelines a set of phrases
which are not considered transparent enough and therefore should not be used in any
communication with a data subject:
∂ ““We may use your personal data to develop new services” (as it is unclear
what the services are or how the data will help develop them);
∂ “We may use your personal data for research purposes” (as it is unclear what
kind of research this refers to); and
39 Recital §39
40 WP 29, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679, 2017
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∂ “We may use your personal data to offer personalised services” (as it is
unclear what the personalisation entails).”
It  is  recommended to  use  active  form in  writing  and  avoid  circumstantial  qualifiers
such as “might”, “may”, “some”, “possible” or “often”. That way the information
should be straight forward and give the data subject knowledge on the processing of
data concerning her.
1. Specific purpose
The notion of specific purpose refers to the collection of personal data. The article
5 (1)(b) GDPR refers to the processing purpose as a principle, stating that the data
should only be collected “for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes” and that all
processing that follows should respect these purposes. This notion is not new: it was
already a principle in the latter Directive 95/46/EC; it is mentioned as a crucial factor
for data protection in the Convention 10841 signed in 1981; and it is considered as a
key for a lawful processing by the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights42.
a) Same or compatible purpose throughout the processing of the personal data
The purpose of processing defined in the beginning of the processing activity needs
to remain the same or compatible with the initial one throughout the whole processing
of that data. For example, if a data subject’s address is collected as a detail for payment,
the processor cannot use this address to send advertisement or use the address for city
planning purposes. In order to use the data subject’s address for several different
purposes, the processor needs consent. The initial purpose needs to be respected and
all further processing should not be processed in a manner that is incompatible with it.
Exception is however made for “archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or
historical research” [article 5 1(b) GDPR], which are considered compatible with the
initial purpose, under the condition that they are subject to “appropriate safeguards”
[article 89 (1)].
41 See the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, 1981. This convention, among other instruments from the Council of Europe, is
considered to be one of the pillars of the data protection law as we know it today.
42 See article 8 of the Charter:”[…] [personal] data must be processed fairly for specified purposes”
34
The WP 29 issued an opinion on purpose limitation in 2013 based on the previous
directive 95/46/EC. The latter directive already put great importance on purpose
limitation, and the WP 29 even considers it as “an essential first step in applying data
protection laws and designing data protection safeguards for any processing
operation43”. Although the opinion bases its reflection on the repealed Directive and
no other opinion has been issued after the adoption of the GDPR, it is likely that the
listed advice still are applicable.
In its opinion, the WP 29 identifies several aspects of purpose limitation. Firstly, the
purpose needs to be specified prior to, or at the latest at the time of the collection of
the personal data. In the case of Föli, it is important that the bike user is kept aware on
the purpose of the collection of her data.
Second, the purpose needs to describe what kind of processing will be performed on
the collected data. For example, it should clearly state whether the data will be used
for payment purposes, or whether the data will allow the system to send
advertisements. The purpose could also state what kind of processing is not performed
on the data. The opinion considers that purposes such as “'improving users'
experience', 'marketing purposes', 'IT-security purposes' or 'future research'” -without
more detail- would be too general and not sufficiently clear for the principle of purpose
requirement.
In the case at hand, Föli collects the bikes’ GPS coordinates and stores them in its
server.  At  this  point,  it  would  be  worth  reflecting  on  the  reason  for  storing  this
identifiable GPS data and whether it would be necessary at all. In case it is considered
necessary, the reason for this processing should be clarified to the bike user. For
example, Föli could consider that the collected GPS data could improve their services
and thus ‘the users’ experience’. It might therefore be worth describing the purpose of
this collection by stating, for example, that “GPS data, after having been minimized
(as  Föli’s  intention  is  to  make  the  GPS  data  as  anonymous  as  possible),  will  be
collected and used for city planning purposes by analysing the most popular bike
routes used”.
43 See WP 29 Opinion 3/2013 on purpose limitation (WP 203), p. 4
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b) Additional safeguards in case of purpose change
In theory, a set of data is collected for a specific purpose or set of purposes. Yet,
this purpose might come to evolve or change if the controller decides, for example, to
add a new service to its business model. In this scenario, the controller cannot assume
that the data subject’s consent is automatically transferred to the new use of data. The
first consent obtained by the data subject only applies to the initial purpose or set of
purposes, and if a new service involves a new purpose or set of purposes, the controller
should make sure to obtain a new consent. The WP 29 refers in these case to
“additional safeguards” which the controller should use, requesting informed consent
from the data subjects for the new purpose.
For example, let’s consider a company selling flowers through a mobile application.
Users can purchase flowers and get them delivered to the address they indicate on the
mobile payment bill. At this point, the company processes the user’s address and
possibly their name to deliver the flowers. After a while, the flower company decides
to evolve their service and use the users’ mobile GPS and the phone number provided
in the bill to send pop-up notifications on the different sorts of flowers they can find
on their way. In this case, the initial purpose of selling and delivering flowers has
evolved. The flower company should request the users’ consent for processing the GPS
data and sending the notifications.
c) Purpose needs to be described in detail by the controller to all processors
As stated in section 3.2.2, it is the controller’s responsibility to ensure that the
purpose is well-defined, that the subject-matter and the duration of the processing are
established as well as “the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal
data and categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller.”
[article 28 (3) (a) GDPR]. All these descriptive details need to be agreed upon and
written down in the contract signed between the controller and the processor.
It goes without saying that the processor needs to respect the purpose limitation
defined by the controller and described in the contract. The processor is only to process
data based on the documented instructions given by the controller.
4.2.2 Adequate, relevant and limited
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According to the third paragraph of the article 5 GDPR, the data shall be
“adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for
which they are processed”. The article refers to the notion of “data minimisation”,
which is an underlying principle in the whole regulation, together with purpose
limitation.
The core idea behind data minimisation is to implement data protection already before
the data is being processed. By limiting the amount and the nature of the data collected,
the risks would shrink, as only the necessary data for the initial purpose will be
processed. For example, a company selling flowers would only process data relating
to the shipment address, and does not need to collect the date of birth or the marital
status of its customers.
a) Data minimisation in the age of big data
Although this paragraph could potentially be the title of a whole thesis, it merely
aims at identifying why many scholars vividly criticise the principle of data
minimisation  in  the  GDPR.  Big  data  refers  to  the  collection  of  massive  amounts  of
data for a future analysis. One of the ideas behind it is to allow for an analysis based
on a large variety of information, thus providing with a complete research result. Tene
and Polonetsky44 provide a good example of a successful big data approach, namely
the Google Flue Trend. The Google Flue Trend used to be a web service operated by
google and analysing the influenza activity in 25 countries all over the world. The aim
was to predict flu outbreaks by analysing queries filled by individuals. The IP address
of the queries were then identified and permitted their localization. However, although
the web service was considered to support public health, the privacy concerns and the
lack of transparency on the methods used were considered too important for the service
to be continued45. Still, during the five years it was operational, it gathered 50 million
queries a week, which makes it a good example of big data analysis.
44 O. Tene and J. Polonetsky, Privacy in the age of big data, A time for big decisions, Feb. 2012
45 See article in the New York Times, M. Helft, Is There a Privacy Risk in Google Flu Trends?, nov.
2008, available at: https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/does-google-flu-trends-raises-new-
privacy-risks/
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Yet the GDPR tends to follow the minimalism rule of art that “less is more”. This trend
is in fact rather logical, keeping in mind that the bigger the amount of the processed
data, the larger the security measures and the organisational measures. The articles of
the GDPR thus essentially encourage the collection of specific data, and not large
amounts of information. Following this logic, data minimisation does not appear to go
hand in hand with big data trends, and it could therefore be concluded that the GDPR
might not be well designed for big data analytics.
b) Föli and data minimisation
In the case of Föli and the city bikes, the amount of data needed is not what so ever
comparable to large scales such as Google’s Flu Trend. The information necessary for
any services undertaken by Föli is quite focused and serves specific aims. Föli needs
the bike user’s name and address for billing purposes, as well as the user’s bank
account details, although the latter are handled by secured mechanisms operated by
Nets. They do also need the user’s status, for example whether she is a student or
whether she is retired, in order to provide with discounts. All this personal data is
necessary for lending out bikes. Let’s imagine that Föli were also to ask the user of her
place of birth or for her marital status. Neither of these sets of information are
necessary nor relevant for renting a city bike, and would therefore go against the
principle of data minimisation.
The principle of data minimisation confers a duty to Föli’s service designer to measure
the amount and the nature of the data needed; and to evaluate which personal data is
necessary in order to perform the service.
4.2.3 Accurate
The article 5(1)(d) GDPR requires that the data processed should be “accurate
and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure
that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they
are processed, are erased or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’)”.
This provision quite clearly allocates administrative duty to the controller and to the
processor to keep the personal data registers under control, permanently. It implies that
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the processed personal data should be monitored regularly, so that it is accurate and
kept up to date; and if it is not considered necessary anymore, rectified or deleted.
Accurate data refers to data that is correct and which corresponds to the individual it
is linked to. Any company in need of personal data usually requires this data to be true
so that the individual can be contacted, for example. However, personal data can
sometimes change; in the case of a name change, or when a person moves to another
address, and it becomes then important to update the data stored in the service’s
database.  Commonly, the data holder should inform the company on this change of
personal data, and the company should then make the effort to retrieve the inaccurate
data and correct it or delete it.
A case study of 201546 investigated by the Irish Data Protection Commissioner
illustrates a bank’s failure to rectify personal data, leading to the disclosure of
confidential information to third parties. In this case, a bank customer requested his
bank, the Allied Irish Bank, to update his address. The demand, although repeated
several times, was not answered, and the bank continued sending mail to the
customer’s previous address. The unknown third parties residing at the previous
address thus received confidential information intended the customer. The
Commissioner decided that the bank had failed to take appropriate security measures
and reminded of the importance of keeping personal data updated at all times.
This provision does also have an underlying obligation in keeping all the personal data
well organised in the system. Keeping in mind that the data holder gets the rights,
according to the article 16 and 17, to rectify and erase data; and according to the article
20, to data portability, it is clever to organise the personal data in a way which
facilitates its access.
Föli is in a favourable situation as the city bike project is new and that no bike user’s
data has just started to be processed. Föli thus has the possibility to organise the
46 Data Protection Commissioner, Case Study 2015, Failure to update customer’s address
compromises the confidentiality of personal data, available at:
https://dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=1620&ad=1#201511
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processed data so as to facilitate its access, and thus its possible rectification and future
deletion.
4.2.4 Defined storage period
The 5th paragraph of the article 5 GDPR concerns the amount of time personal data
should  be  stored.  It  states  that  data  should  be “kept in a form which permits
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for
which the personal data are processed”. In other words, personal data should be kept
for the strict maximum of time required by the purpose. For example, let’s imagine
that a museum collects the visitors’ phone number in order to send informative text-
messages during the museum visit. In this scenario, the museum needs to delete the
phone numbers once the visitors have left the premises of the museum. The initial
purpose of the processing was to send information, not to be able to contact the visitors
later nor to send advertisement (unless the museum asks the visitors for permission to
do so).
This paragraph concerns all kinds of processing activities which enable the
identification of data holders, and not only the ‘storage’ of the data. The processing
time could last from a few minutes to several years, depending on the purpose for
which the data is used.
Exception is however given to data stored for archiving purposes “in the public
interest, scientific, historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance
with Article 89(1)” (relating to archives), in which case personal data can be stored for
a longer time than the initial purpose.
In the city bike system, Föli is not processing personal data for archiving purposes.
They therefore need to make sure to delete all  personal data which is still  available
after the initial purpose has ended. For instance, the bike user’s information should be
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deleted from the Föli database once the user cancels her subscription. The Finnish law
47 does not provide any other timeframe.
4.2.5 Appropriate security measures
The last paragraph concerns the security features concerning the processing of the
personal data. It states that personal data shall be “processed in a manner that ensures
appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised
or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using
appropriate technical or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’)”.
This  provision  is  stated  as  a  principle,  and  can  be  read  together  with  the  article  32
referring to the “security of processing” and asserting that “ […] the controller and
the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to
ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk […]” A more detailed  analysis on
the possible security measures available to Föli will be made in the fifth section.
The first part of this section aimed at identifying the 6 main principles concerning
processing of personal data. The controller, in this case Föli, is held responsible for
ensuring that these principles are respected, and should therefore take all necessary
safeguards in order to guarantee that.
4.3 The notion of “consent”
The GDPR requires obtaining consent before processing personal data. This consent
mechanism is subject to several modalities and the controller should make sure that
the consent is lawful.
47 See the paragraph 34 of the law on personal data 22.4.1999/523 “Henkilörekisteri, joka ei ole enää
rekisterinpitäjän toiminnan kannalta tarpeellinen, on hävitettävä, jollei siihen talletettuja tietoja ole
erikseen säädetty tai määrätty säilytettäviksi tai jollei rekisteriä siirretä 35 §:ssä tarkoitetulla tavalla
arkistoon”.
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4.3.1 Consent is one of the lawful grounds for processing personal data
The obtention of consent has a core importance in making the data processing lawful.
Consent is not an obligation, as processing could be performed without it in specific
cases, but in the event that the processing is not necessary for some contractual or legal
obligation, the obtention of consent from the data subject is mandatory. The notion of
consent presented by the GDPR has evolved since the latter Directive 95/46/EC, yet it
remains one of the six lawful grounds for processing personal data, among others listed
in the article 6 GDPR.
The processing of personal data is thus lawful either when consent has been obtained
from the data holder, or when the processing is necessary for:
- “the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order
to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;
- compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;
- protecting the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person;
- the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise
of official authority vested in the controller;
- purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party
[…]”
Although all provisions’ scope seem quite clear, it goes differently with the last one.
A wave of legal debate has arisen in interpreting the notion of ‘legitimate interest’,
which, according to the last bullet point, could constitute a lawful ground for
processing personal data without obtaining consent. This provision catches attention
as it would offer an “easier” way to process personal data, without requesting  consent.
Although ‘legitimate interests’ are widely used as lawful grounds for processing in
crime or fraud prevention48, their utilization is still  legally monitored. To start with,
48 More examples on legitimate interests available in the discussion draft by the Center for




the processing of personal data needs to be necessary and proportionate to the purposes
of the legitimate interests. The requirement of ‘necessity’ implies that if the interests
of the controller can be pursued in any other way, they should, by for instance
obtaining the data holder’s consent.
Furthermore, ‘legitimate interests’ is also explained and limited in recital 47. It states
that processing on the basis of legitimate interests  could only be lawful:
- if  “the interests or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject are
not overriding”;
- when the processing is not performed “by public authorities in the performance
of their tasks.”
In other words,  legitimate interests seem to be used as lawful processing grounds if
they are necessary and proportionate, if the fundamental rights of the data holders are
not overriding and when processing is not performed by public authorities. As
discussed among the Center for Information Policy Leadership, most of the examples
lawfully grounding their processing on ‘legitimate interests’ are anti-fraud purposes or
crime prevention, anti-money laundry watchlists and other preventive and detection
services.
Föli is under obligation to request consent from the bike users in order to process their
personal data. The contractual bike hiring service does not justify processing on the
grounds of ‘the performance of a contract’, as personal data is not actually necessary
for renting a bike (compared to services where the actual service consists in processing
personal data). No legal obligation, public interests or vital interests of the data subject
are either applicable in this case. Nor is legitimate interests, as Föli cannot possibly
argue that their need  to process all the bike users’ personal data is clearly more
important than the fundamental rights of the client.
4.3.2 Definition and features for a valid consent
Despite not being a novel principle, the GDPR defines consent in the article 4 (11) as
“any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s
wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her”.
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According to this definition, the data holder needs to give a free, specific, unambiguous
and  informed  consent.  All  these  conditions  have  to  be  met.  The  WP  29  makes  a
thorough study on each element constituting valid consent in their guidelines on
consent, starting with the notion of ‘free consent’.
Freely given
The data holder’s consent needs to be freely given, without impeachment of
any kind. The data holder should have real control over her personal data and she
should not feel obligated to give her consent. Recital 43 provides additional
explanations on ‘free consent’. There is no free consent if the consent cannot be
separately given to distinct sets of processing operations where these operations could
actually be consented for individually. For example, if a flower company requires
consent for processing the client’s address for flower delivery, it should not include in
the  same  consent  mechanism  the  right  of  processing  the  client’s  GPS  data  for
notifications not linked to the flower delivery. The data holder should in this case be
able to consent to the processing of her address separately from the processing of her
GPS data.
There is not free consent either if a service is dependent on consent and consent is not
actually necessary for that kind of performance.
The notion of free consent is also linked to the concept of personal autonomy. As
Rawls 49describes  it  based  on  an  argument  held  by  Kant:  “a person is acting
autonomously when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate
possible expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being”. In other words,
a person would give free consent and be autonomous when he bases his decision on
his own perception. A data holder should thus give her consent and tick the box when,
after reflexion, she considers that she is willing to share her personal data for this
specific purpose. By doing so, the data holder gives the authorization to the controller
to process her personal data. This authorization should be given autonomously and
should not be forced, thus constituting a free consent.
The concept of personal autonomy also calls back to the right to ‘informational self-
determination’, where the data holder has the right to choose how, when and what
49 J. Rawls, The theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1973
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personal data will be processed. Strictly speaking, it is the same notion as the
empowerment  of  data  subjects  that  the  GDPR  is  striving  for.  As  stated  in  the  very
beginning of the regulation in Recital 7, “Natural persons should have control over
their own personal data”, and free consent might just be the first condition for
fulfilling it.
In practice, free consent is obtained by giving the data holder the possibility to read
the purpose for the personal data processing as well as the different conditions relating
to it. Consent can be obtained orally or by writing. In the case of Föli, it seems more
likely that consent will be given by writing, and therefore two elements have to be
respected:
 Föli can request the data subject to tick a box, as a sign for approval after having
read the purpose and the conditions
 Föli should allow the data subject to check and set the technical settings. This
is a way of obtaining consent for separate purposes than the initial one, for
example acquiring the authorization to send news to the data subject’s email
address.
No box should be ticked by default, and no technical settings should be agreed upon
by default. Silence and inactivity do not count either as acceptance by the data holder
since that would go against the principle of free and autonomous consent.
Specific
Consent needs to be specific to one or several purposes, as provided by the article
6(1).  The aim of this specificity is  to ensure transparency of the data processing, so
that the data subject knows for what purpose she has consented to provide her personal
data. It implies that the controller specifies in detail the purpose, both to the data holder
and to the processors. It also means that the purpose or the set of purposes need to be
respected, and that in the event that the purpose changes, a new consent is requested
from the data holder50.
50 See “Additional safeguards in case of purpose change” in section 4.1.2
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Informed
Consent has to be informed. This requires that the data subject gets access to
information relating to the processing of her personal data, namely the purpose of the
processing, as well as the circumstances under which it will be processed: what kind
of data, for how long it will be processed, where and for how long it will be stored…
The right to information goes hand in hand with the principle of transparency defined
in the article 5 and in the section 4.1.2 of this paper.
The WP 29 identifies six pieces of information that need to be made available to the
data subjects, of which four are applicable to Föli, namely:
∂ the controller’s identity
∂ the purpose of each operation for which the specific consent is requested
∂ the kind of data which is processed
∂ the data subject’s right to withdraw consent
The GDPR lets understand that any format for this information is possible, such as
written  and  oral  statements,  as  well  as  video  or  audio  messages.  Recital  32  and  the
article 7(2) provide thorough indications on how to inform the data holder. First,
seeking consent should be done in “a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the
other matters”, which means that the information relating to the processing operations
and the boxes to be ticked need to be well put forward. Second, this information should
be  forwarded  in  “an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain
language” or as Einstein stated,  “if you can’t explain it to a six-year old, you don’t
understand it yourself.”. This does naturally apply to the way the information is
provided, it could for example be clever to avoid a lot of small and compact text to be
read from a mobile device.
The aim of having an informed consent is to make sure the data holder knows what
she is consenting to. Yet, a problem has been identified as to know how ‘real’ the
consent actually is in practice. Numerous studies have come to the conclusion that
although the law requires consent mechanisms to be put in place, many are the data
holders who give their consent without acknowledging what they are consenting to.
Basically, they are ticking the box and scrolling down for a fast access to the wanted
service. Legally, consent may still be given, but how is this consent perceived from a
moral point of view? This issue questions the efficacity of the consent mechanism as
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we know it today, and hopefully tickles the imagination for new ways of informing the
data subjects and catching their attention.
Unambiguous
Finally, the consent needs to be unambiguous in order to be valid. It means that
the data subject needs to give its authorization for processing her personal data by “a
statement or a clear affirmative act”, as indicated in the article 4(11) GDPR. Even
though  the  best  way  of  obtaining  affirmative  consent  would  be  to  get  a  written
statement by the data subject writing what she is consenting to, this method seems
unrealistic, as indicated by the WP 29. It would thus suffice with a box to tick after the
enouncement of intelligible and easily-understood terms and conditions.
Electronic means
Föli will most likely obtain consent and inform their bike users on the existing
terms and conditions by electronic means. These means are specially considered by
the  GDPR.  For  instance,  as  provided  by  Recital  32,  if  consent  is  requested  through
electronic means, “the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive
to the use of the service for which it  is  provided.” In other words,  Föli  has to make
sure that consent is requested, and in this precise case of city bikes, that it is made sure
that the data subject’s attention is caught. The WP 29 makes clear that the GDPR
approves of physical motions as clear affirmative actions, such as for example “turning
a smartphone around clockwise”. However, just scrolling down do not count as an
affirmative action as it is too easy and therefore could be unambiguous.
Valid consent requires several different elements, which all have to be respected.
The subject of consent is of particular importance within the GDPR, as it is the tool
through which control is given to the data subject on the processing of her data. The
rules to follow for companies, and in particular Föli, are therefore quite precise and
practical indications can be given. The concept of explicit concent was not described
in this paper as it does not concern Föli51.
51 Explicit consent from the data subject is only required in specific cases when specific categories of
data are processed, when data is transferred to third countries or international organisations without
additional safeguards or when processing is performed by automatic decision-making, including
profiling. See the article 9 GDPR.
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4.4 The notion of “storage”
Storing information is considered as one way of processing data. It therefore has
to be legally framed, and it is under the responsibility of the controller. The mode of
storage, either on the controller’s or the processor’s own physical server or in a cloud,
need to be chosen and respected throughout the processing of the data.
Föli intends to store the collected personal data in a physical server in Turku.
The GDPR keeps silent on the methods of storage to be used and the best ways to keep
them secure. However, the French CNIL provides with guidelines52 for secure
storages, in particular for physical servers. The CNIL recommends that:
∂ Access to the server should be limited to special staff. The CNIL recommends
that the servers should only be accessible by authorized staff, including the
servers’ tools and interfaces.
∂ Updates should be carried out regularly. The CNIL suggests an automatic
update scanner every week.
∂ Passwords should be considered seriously and changed regularly, especially
when staff members are changing.
∂ Safeguards should be performed regularly. The GDPR provides in the article
32(1)(c) that the controller and the processer shall ensure “the ability to restore
the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of
a physical or technical incident”. In other words, there should be a backup if
the server fails.
52 Guidelines on securing physical servers by CNIL available at: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/securite-
securiser-les-serveurs (in French)
48
∂ Cryptography should be considered as a good means of securing the server
network.  CNIL  recommends  using  ‘Transport  Layer  Security’  (TLS),  in
replacement of the nowadays prohibited SSL (Secure Sockets Layer). The aim
of TLS is to guarantee good privacy security between communicating
computer applications.
The  CNIL disapproves  on  using  unsecure  services  and  on  using  the  host  server  for
other uses than the management of the stored data.
The management of data storage is not very well documented, yet it is considered as
an act of processing personal data and is therefore to be taken seriously. Storage, in
addition to  being secure, should also be well organized in order to allow  quick access
in order to ensure the rights of the data subject.
4.5 The rights of the data subject
The GDPR is innovative in the fact that it strives to provide the data subject with
as many rights as possible in order to keep control over her personal data. As stated in
Recital 7, “natural persons should have control over their own personal data” and this
control results from a set of rights provided by the regulation. This section identifies
the rights and the provisions relevant to Föli.
4.5.1 Right of access
First, the data holder needs to be informed whether personal data concerning her
is being processed. This information should be given by the controller, who also should
give access to the personal data. The article 15 states that the controller should inform
the data holder on:
∂ “the purposes of the processing”;
∂ “the categories of personal data concerned”;
∂ the recipient of the personal data;
∂ the  period  of  time  during  which  the  personal  data  will  be  stored  “or, if not
possible, the criteria used to determine that period”;
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∂ “the existence of the right to request from the controller rectification or
restriction of personal data or restriction of processing or personal data”;
∂ The possibility for lodging complaints with a supervisory authority, in Finland
the supervisor authority being the data protection Ombudsman
(Tietosuojavaltuutettu),
∂ The source of the personal data, in the event that it has not been collected from
the data holder,
∂ The existence of automated decision-making, if any.
The right to access does in practice give the data holder the right to obtain a copy of
the personal data being processed. This copy could be delivered in paper or through
electronic means. Although the content of the information is practically similar, the
right to access is different from the consent mechanism and the notion of ‘informed
consent’. The right to access is actually to be considered as a fulfilment of the principle
of fairness and transparency, as it enables the data holder to review the data that is
being processed and under which circumstances. The request for information occurs
while the data is being processed, not before, as it is the case with the information
contained in the terms and conditions and to which consent is given. The Recital 63
tells that the aim of giving the data subject access to her processed personal data is to
give her the possibility to be aware and to verify the lawfulness of the processing. In
other words, giving her control over personal data concerning her.
All communication for the exercise of the right of the data holder are subject to certain
rules, as submitted by the article 12. The article 15 on the right of access is one of
them. The article 12 states that:
1) the controller shall always communicate with the data holder “in a concise,
transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain
language”;
2) the controller shall not hinder the exercise of the data subject’s right to
access;
3) the controller has one month to answer to the data subject’s requests, either
positively or negatively. However, if the controller is refusing to act on the
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request, the “unfounded or excessive character of the request” should be well
demonstrated.
This right to access of the data subject is however subject to one limitation, namely
the rights and freedoms of others.
For Föli and for the city bike project, the right of access means that every bike user
could request a copy of all personal data concerning her that is being processed, as
well as all details presented in the article 15. After receiving a request, Föli has one
month to provide the data holder with a copy, unless the request is unfounded or goes
against  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  others,  in  which  case  Föli  should  inform  the
requesting data subject about its decision.
4.5.2 Right to rectification
It is conceivable that personal data changes during the time it is being processed. It is
thus usually in the data subject’s interest to rectify inaccurate personal data concerning
her. The GDPR provides in the article 16 the right to rectification, giving the data
holder the right to “obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of
inaccurate personal data concerning him or her”. The same goes for data that needs to
be completed.
For example, a Föli user could move and thus her home address would be inaccurate.
After request from the user, Föli should rectify the user’s address in the database. A
perfect example of a failed right to rectification is provided by the case law of 2015
investigated by the Irish Data Protection Commissioner and presented earlier in this
thesis53.  As of today, it appears that Föli’s users are able to rectify their personal data
directly through Föli’s user platform.
4.5.3 Right to erasure or ‘right to be forgotten’
Hot debates in Europe resulted in ‘the right to be forgotten’, especially after the case
law Google Spain v. Agencia Espanola de proteccion de datos (‘Google Spain’) in
2014. This right is still controversial and its practical applicability is still raising vivid
questions among scholars. In practice, the right to be forgotten or the right to erasure
gives the right to a data holder to request total erasure of data concerning her without
53 See section 4.2.3 on “accurate”
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undue delay, as provided in the article 17 GDPR. The undue delay refers to a period
of one month, as stated in the article 12(3). In the case Google Spain, The European
court of Justice was questioned on the applicability of the Directive 95/46 to search
engines, as a Spanish national wanted all information concerning him from his
attachment and garnishment proceedings dated 1998 to be deleted from Google Inc,
Google Spain and the newspaper La Vanguardia. The Court ruled that search engines
operators  should  remove  personal  data  if  so  requested  by  the  data  holder  when this
data has been published by third party websites. However, the data subject’s right
should also be balanced against the interest of the public.
The GDPR’s article 17 respects this decision and defines a set of situations where the
right to be forgotten is applicable. It does even go further by obliging the controller to
inform all third parties of the data holder’s request to be forgotten, in particular when
the data has been made public [article 17(2) GDPR]. In Föli’s case, the personal data
should never be made public. Yet Föli, as a controller, should make sure that all
processors are deleting the personal data concerning the requesting data holder.
Among all grounds listed by the GDPR, Föli should consider that the bike user has the
right to erasure when:
∂ “the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purpose for which
they were collected or otherwise processed”: if Föli for example shut down the
whole bike system, the bike users would get the right to demand the right to
erasure, and delete all personal data concerning them from Föli’s database.
∂ “the data subject withdraws consent […]”: as clearly stated, if the data subject
withdraws her consent, she can also request the right to erasure, obliging Föli
to delete all data concerning her from their database.
∂ “the personal data has been unlawfully processed”: if Föli has for example
failed to obtain consent before processing personal data, the data holder could
request the erasure of the personal data concerning her.
Yet, as ruled by the ECJ, there are a few limitations to this right. Föli can therefore not
respond to the right to erasure when the processing of the data is necessary “for
exercising the right of freedom of expression and information”, “for compliance with
a legal obligation […] to which the controller is subject or for the performance of a
task carried out in the public interest”, “for archiving purposes in the public interest,
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scientific or historical purposes or statistical purposes” and “for the establishment,
exercise of defence of legal claims”. [article 17(3) GDPR] However, Föli still has the
obligation to communicate its decision to the data holder, and explain the grounds for
which they refuse to respond to the request for erasure.
4.5.4 Right to data portability
∂ The concept of data portability
The article 20 of the GDPR creates a new right in the data protection field, giving the
possibility  for  data  holders  to  “receive personal data concerning her […] in a
structured, commonly used and machine -readable format”. Once in possession of her
personal data, the data subject can choose to transmit this personal data to another
controller, or can directly request that the personal data be transmitted from one
controller to another. Yet, this does not mean that the personal data is erased from the
controller’s database, and the data subject can continue to use the controller’s services
as long as her personal data is being processed by them. As pointed out by the WP 29,
this right empowers the data subject with more control over her personal data.  Data
portability is aimed at supporting the free flow of data in the European Union and will
tighten the competition between service providers. The GDPR prohibits controllers
from  hindering  the  exercise  of  this  right  and  the  transmission  of  personal  data  to
another controller upon request.
The personal data subject to the right to data portability is the personal data that has
been provided to the controller by the data holder. This includes any data which has
been produced while using the service, as the WP 29 identifies as ‘raw data’. For
example, the GPS route linked and assembled to the data subject constitutes raw data
and will therefore be subject to the right to data portability. The personal data does
undoubtedly need to concern the requesting data subject only.
o Föli as a sending data controller
In the event that Föli need to answer to a right to portability, they should ensure that
the data they are about to transmit corresponds to the data the data subject wants to
transfer. For example, if a data subject wants to change her city bike provider, but still
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keep Föli as a bus service, Föli should be careful to only transfer the personal data
required for the bike service.
Föli would also need to make sure that all processors are cooperative to answer to the
request. The WP 29 recommends implementing special procedures between the
controller and the processors in order to easily answer to a right to portability. As for
pretty much all the provisions under the GDPR, good organisational measures seem to
facilitate many sets of operations, including data portability.
o Föli as a receiving data controller
In case Föli become the receiving controller, obtaining personal data from another
controller on the request of a data holder, they become responsible for the new personal
data. As with any personal data, they will have to respect the article 5 GDPR and its
principles, namely fairness, lawfulness and transparency, data minimization, purpose
limitation, integrity, accuracy as well as confidentiality, storage limitation and
accountability.
For the purpose of data minimisation, Föli would have to ensure that the received
personal data is relevant and limited to what is necessary for the purpose. The purpose
will have to be communicated to the data holder before collecting her consent. All data
received which is not considered as relevant to what is necessary to the city bike system
should not be kept nor processed. As a matter of fact, Föli, as a receiving controller,
do never have the obligation to accept all transmitted data resulting from a data
portability request.
∂ Limits to data portability
The  right  to  data  portability  does  also  contain  limits.  To  start  with,  although  the
‘sending data controller’ has no choice but to facilitate the exercise of this right and
possibly transmit the portable data to another controller, the ‘receiving data controller’
can refuse to accept the data. That could be the case, for example, if the ‘receiving data
controller’ considers that the data is not relevant to the service it is providing.
Second, the right to portability can only be performed if no other rights of other data
subjects are prejudiced. No personal data belonging to a third party can be included in
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the set of data to be transmitted, as this would hinder the third parties to exercise their
right of access, for example.
∂ The way personal data is transferred in practice
o Authenticating the requesting data subject
Before transmitting personal data, the controller needs to ascertain the identity of the
requested data subject. While the GDPR is silent on the procedures to use in order to
verify someone’s identity, the WP 29 recommends that “all requesting data subjects’
identity should be controlled before handing over any personal data”. For instance,
the controller can request additional information from the data holder, without
however collecting too much additional personal information. Ideally, verification
would be enabled through the already existing personal data, and authentication could
be performed by using the user account, her username and password.  A secret question
for which the answer is  known both by the controller and by the data subject could
also be used.
Additionally  to  what  WP  29  recommends,  there  also  exist  solutions  for  identity
managements. Developed for instance by Microsoft54 and  considered  by  Lessig55,
identity managements are IT programs which enable the user to only give out the
minimum necessary information needed. For example, if Föli would need to know
whether  the  user  is  a  student  who  would  benefit  from  a  discount,  only  that  bit  of
information will be revealed. Such a solution goes further than merely authenticating
the requesting data subject, as it also minimises the amount of data processed by the
controller. The controller would thus be sure of the identity of the data holder and only
get the minimum necessary information, which would ultimately increase security and
privacy. As such, an identity management solution would already be an interesting
security feature.
o Time frame
As for the other rights of the data subject, the controller has one month to respond to a
data subject’s request, including data portability, as provided in the article 12(3).
54 See Microsoft’s Azure identity management technology, available at:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-platform/identity-management
55 See L.Lessig, Code 2.0, chapter on ‘regulating code’
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However, the WP 29 states that this one-month period can be extended to three months
“for complex cases, provided that the data subject has been informed about the reasons
for such delay within one month of the original request”.
o Personal data formats
The article 20(1) indicates that the personal data being transmitted from the controller
to the requesting data holder should be in a “structured, commonly used and machine-
readable format”. Here  again,  the  GDPR  does  not  provide  with  a  model  of
transmission which would ensure the interoperability of all systems, as that is most
likely impossible. However, the WP 29 suggests using “the most commonly used
opened formats”, such as JSON, XML, CSV… to cite just a few.
o Secured transmission of personal data
Securing personal data might be one of the most challenging duties of the controller.
Within the right to portability, this duty might even be more difficult to guarantee, as
the controller needs to be sure to authenticate the requesting data holder.
The controller also needs to somehow transmit the requested data from a point A to a
point B, from one server to another. There is made no mention of the methods to adopt,
neither in the GDPR nor in the WP 29’s guidelines. However, taking into consideration
the controller’s obligation under the article 5(1)(f) to ensure “appropriate security of
the personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing
and against accidental loss, destruction or damage using appropriate technical or
organisational measures”, it seems obvious that all means should be taken to transfer
the data safely, for example by encrypting it and handing it out physically to the
requesting data holder in a memory stick.
The data subject is given several rights under the GDPR, all aimed at giving her
control over the personal data concerning her.  Only the right to data portability is  a
‘new’ right and possibly triggers the most questions and debates. The controller should
make sure that these rights can be exercised by the data holder. Among all these rights,
the right to object does not appear to be an applicable right in the case of Föli, as it is
only applicable to situations where data processing is necessary “for the performance
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of a task carried out in the public interest” or “for the purposes of the legitimate
interests pursued by the controller” [article 21(1) GDPR].
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR ENHANCED PRIVACY
SECURITY IN THE CITY BIKE SYSTEM
Protecting personal data is what the GDPR is all about. Several security methods exist,
but no clear policy provides a clear methodology on how to efficiently protect personal
data. This chapter aims at analysing the most common security techniques and the
most convenient ones for Föli.
5.1 The reasons for adopting security solutions
Before analysing the different methods, it is worth understanding why such
methods should be considered and possibly adopted. Nowadays, data is rarely
collected to be used once, and same goes with personal data. The controller is required
to have a clear and defined purpose for processing personal data, yet additional
purposes such as research, real-time information and statistics could also benefit from
this data. For this reason, it would be convenient to obscure the elements enabling the
identification of an individual, and only keep data which does not require any data
protection.
Föli has shown interest in these methods as they have plans to adopt a smart grid based
on a heat map capable of showing the most used traffic routes in real time. For that
purpose, they would require real-time GPS data from the bike users.
However, managing and protection all the personal data relating to the real-time
behaviour of the users can be challenging, and the controller has a big responsibility
in doing so. The GDPR summons the controller and the processors to actively protect
all personal data they are processing. For these kinds of situations and in order to
prevent violations of data protections, the GDPR strongly recommends adopting
security measures, such as anonymisation techniques, or privacy by design solutions
such as pseudonomisation or data minimisation. On top of examining these
recommendations, this chapter analyses the ‘personal data systems’ as a viable solution
for protection personal data.
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5.2 Anonymisation of the personal data
Föli could in theory benefit from anonymising the biking routes for city planning
purposes, but might need to identify the method that fits them best as the GDPR does
not define nor mention anonymisation techniques as a solution for secure processing.
The  reason  for  this  is  stated  in  the  Recital  26,  as  the  GDPR  considers  that  “the
principles of data protection should […] not apply to anonymous information”. In
other words, the GDPR only applies to information which relates to an identifiable or
identified natural person. Anonymized data unable identification of a natural person,
and is therefore not covered by this regulation.
Anonymisation would be a drastic solution for the controller who wants to process
data without being bound by data protection rules. Anonymisation would allow for
continued use of data, without fearing violating someone’s integrity. Obtaining
consent would no longer be needed, data could be transferred freely… As explained
by the WP 2956,  “once a dataset is truly anonymised and individuals are no longer
identifiable, European data protection law no longer applies.”
Anonymisation techniques are quite commonly used as a way of securing personal
data. Yet, anonymisation requires that an operation is performed on the personal data
in order to render in anonymous. The data has to be separated from the ‘identifier’,
and several techniques have been explored for that end.
All techniques have the same aim: to irreversibly separate the identifying elements
from a set of data. This would result in data that no longer can be related to an identified
or identifiable natural person.
5.2.1 Anonymity criteria
The WP 29 has come up with three criteria aimed at  identifying whether data is
anonymous, which are:
- Single out: Is it possible to single out an individual?
56 WP 29, Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques, 2014
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- Linkability:  Is  it  possible  to  link  two  sets  of  data  belonging  to  one  same
individual?
- Inference: Is it possible to deduce, with a high probability, information on an
individual?
If none of these questions is answered positively, the data is theoretically anonymous.
However, it suffices that one of these criteria is fulfilled to not be classified as
anonymous  data,  and  to  require  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  possible  risks  of
reidentification.
5.2.2 Anonymity methods
Vivid debates are still ongoing among computer scientists as to know what
anonymization method is the best, and whether any at all functions in practice. Several
methods exist, yet all of them present risks of reidentification.
The professor Martyn Thomas57 identifies four ways to anonymise data (perturbation,
generalisation, suppression and replacement) and the WP 29 regroup these four into
two main families, namely generalisation and randomisation.
Generalisation
The aim of the technique of generalisation is to replace the specificity of the
identifier by a general information, for example a data of birth can be replaced by the
birth year, a city can be replaced by a region… Generalisation offers good guarantees
against the possibility to single out identifiable information, but remains quite risky
considering the risks of ‘linkability’ and ‘inference’. The family of the generalisation
techniques encompass technical methods such as the k-anonymity, where identifiers
are deleted or generalised.
57 See the presentation from Professor Martyn Thomas CBE, Big Data: The Broken Promise of
Anonymisation
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For example, in this table58, the name and the religion of the individuals have been
deleted, and their age have been generalised and minimised to the year of birth.
Race Birth Gender ZIP Problem
Black 1964 f 0213* obesity
Black 1964 m 0213* chest pain
White 1964 m 0213* chest pain
The  result  thus  shows that  a  black  woman,  born  in  1964 and  domiciled  in  the  area
which ZIP corresponds to 0213 is obese. However, although some information has
been  erased  and  some other  generalised,  the  data  left  is  at  risk  of  being  relinked  to
individuals, and thus reidentified. Each element narrows down the amount of people
concerned and could, if crossed with other details, single out an individual. If that
occurs, the anonymization would have failed.
Randomisation
Randomising data refers to the action of randomly changing it and altering its
veracity in order to weaken the risk of linking the data to the individual.
Randomization englobes several techniques, such as noise addition, permutation, and
differential privacy. An example of noise addition would be, for example, to change a
user’s biking distance with an accuracy of +-5 kilometres, diminishing drastically the
chances of linking the distance to a specific individual. It is important that the
randomization is performed so that it becomes impossible to figure out how the data
has been randomized.
The WP 29 points out that data can be both randomized and generalized, which will
result in increased privacy protection. Nevertheless, all methods of anonymisation
present risks of reidentification.
58 This table is taken from a larger table named ‘figure 2, an example of k-anonymity’, and taken from
Latanya Sweeney, “k-Anonymity: A model for protecting privacy”, International Journal on
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10 (5), 2002; 557-570
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5.2.3 The risks of anonymising data
The large majority of scholars analysing anonymising techniques consider that
anonymization does not guarantee the end it aims for. Some do even talk about “the
failure of anonymization”. Paul Ohm believes that “data can be either useful or
perfectly anonymous but never both”; Rubinstein and Hartzog59 consider that “perfect
anonymization is a myth”.
The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  first  aim  of  anonymising  personal  data,  namely
irreversibly separate identifying elements from a set of data so that the natural person
behind the data no longer can be identified, is very risky. As pointed out by Martyn
Thomas, a very little amount of details is actually needed to identify someone. He
illustrates his statement by an identifying test taken in the US in 2000, where 62% of
Americans were uniquely identified by their zip code (which in itself narrowed down
the amount of people from nearly 300 million to 7500), their gender and their date of
birth. Based on these three sets of data, all objectively anonymous if considered
separately, people were uniquely identified. A date of birth alone is only a number, but
added to one or more (anonymous) details, the probability for identifying the natural
person it concerns rises. This is what the WP 29 identifies as the risks of ‘linkability’
and of ‘inference’, where identifiable data is established by linking to sets of
anonymous data or deducing with a high probability the identity of a data holder.
5.2.4 Föli and anonymization
Although there are risks, Föli would profit from anonymising data in order to use
it for city planning and heat map projects. Föli’s heat map, imagined showing the most
used routes by bikes, would ideally be based on the bike’s GPS information, all other
data concerning the user being either deleted or generalised, thus applying the k-
anonymity method. However, the situation gets tricky because the heat map would get
more useful if being in real-time, enabling users to know and follow how the bikes are
59 Ira S. Rubinstein and Woodrow Hartzog, "Anonymization and Risk" (2015)
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moving on a real-time basis. Real time maps showing the ongoing status of traffic do
exist, and anonymization is sometimes performed by automated means. For example,
the service HERE available at wego.here.com base their service on location data and
shows through maps the state of traffic and the intensity of traffic jams. The data is
collected through satellite and HERE vehicles driving around. In order to guarantee
privacy, the service uses privacy60 algorithms and detection rates aiming at blurring all
faces and licence plates which are caught on the map pictures. In the event that these
automated means miss an identifying element, they encourage the individuals to report
their concerns through their internet website. This privacy solution is also used by
Google maps street view. However, blurring a face or hiding a licence plate still shows
identifiable elements such as the person and the colour of the car. Although the person
and the car cannot with certainty be identified, there would still be a high probability
of reidentification.
Whatever method Föli choses to adopt, a thorough risk analysis should be performed
in order to lessen the probability of reidentification.
5.3 Encryption
One practical tool used for securing data is encryption. Schneier considers it as a
“critical component of security61” and thinks that it is possible to create “unbreakable
encryption”, in other words really strong encryption systems with no backdoor. Such
encryption allows employers to communicate without risking for the communication
to fall in the wrong hands, and allows for data to be sent safely. Further analysis on the
different methods of encryption is developed in the section 2.3.2.
Encryption is defined by Oxford’s Dictionary of the Internet as “the process of
transforming some text known as the plain text into a form which cannot be read by
anyone who does not have knowledge of the mechanisms used to carry out the
encryption.” To access the encrypted data, the reader needs a key.
60 FAQ about HERE cars and map data available at: https://www.here.com/en/drive-schedule
61 See B. Schneier, The Importance of Strong Encryption to Security, 2016
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Föli should consider encrypting the personal data they are processing as well as
securing their internal communications through Virtual Private Networks (VPN).
Encryption  is  also  a  solution  to  be  considered  when  users  use  their  right  to  data
portability and request for all their data to be sent to them: the transfer of data is still a
processing of data and needs to be secured. Encryption is a good way for securing the
transfers and ensuring that the data reaches the right destination.
5.4 Privacy by design
5.4.1 The concept
Privacy by design is a fairly new concept of privacy protection launched by Ann
Cavoukian in the early 2000s. In 2010, this framework was passed by the International
Assembly of Privacy and Data Protection Authorities in Jerusalem as an International
Privacy Standard. Today, privacy by design is considered as one of the main security
solutions by the GDPR and is embodied in the article 25.
Ann Cavoukian considers62 by ‘privacy by design’, “ embedding privacy up front, into
the design specifications and architecture of new systems and processes, so that
protecting personal data becomes the default condition. Instead of treating privacy as
an after thought, […] PbD is proactive and preventative in nature – it is essentially
“baked in” right from the outset.”
The notion ‘privacy by design’ says it all: tools ensuring privacy should be built in by
design into the data processing mechanism in order to guarantee a sufficient level or
data protection. Data protection compliance should be built in from the start and would
block privacy-violating behaviors. Lessig provides with a good example63 when he
argues in favor of “code is law”: he describes a virtual world owned and built by its
residents,  and  compares  it  with  the  real  world,  in  particular  with  the  example  of
trespassing. Lessig observes that in the real world, laws can penalize individuals for
trespassing on someone else’s property, but the physical action of trespassing is still
possible, whereas in the virtual world, the virtual individuals simply cannot trespass.
The virtual world’s code is designed so as to unable trespassing. It goes the same with
62 A. Cavoukian, Privacy by Design and the Promise of SmartData
63 See L.Lessig, Code 2.0, in the chapter on ‘cyberspaces’
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privacy by design, apart from the fact that this is not a virtual world: the processing
system should be designed as to guarantee compliance with the GDPR and to protect
the processed personal data.
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) encourages64 organisations and service
providers to implement privacy by design by, in particular when:
∂ “building new IT systems for storing or accessing personal data;
∂ developing legislation, policy or strategies that have privacy implications;
∂ embarking on a data sharing initiative; or
∂ using data for new purposes.”
Föli is in a favourable situation as the city bike system is brand new from scratch. It
becomes  thus  easier  to  implement  data  protection  compliance  tools  from  the
beginning. Proactively protecting personal data allows to identify potential problems
at an early stage, respect the GDPR, increase awareness of data protection across the
company and ultimately avoid misusing individuals’ personal data. It is also to be
mentioned that it is far cheaper to design privacy solutions in advance rather than
‘repairing’ misuses later: prevention is better than cure.
The GDPR in the article 25 respects this idea and discloses that “the controller shall,
both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the
processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such
as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data protection principles,
such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary
safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation
and protect the rights of data subjects.” The GDPR goes even further and adds in the
second paragraph the requirement for data protection by default, requiring that the
controller shall only process personal data “which are necessary for each specific
purpose of the processing”.
64 ICO recommendations with regard to privacy by design available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/privacy-by-design/
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In  this  article,  the  GDPR thus  suggests  four  elements  which  are  important  for  data
protection by design and by default.
1. Proactive timing
The concept of privacy by design is groundbreaking as it requires that protective
measures be setup before processing data. It makes it a proactive approach. With
regard to privacy by design, the GDPR considers that security measures should be set
up “both at the time of the determination of the means of the processing and at the time
of the processing itself “, This requires from the controller that the privacy tools are
decided in advance and possibly updated and improved during the processing
operations.
2. Pseudonymisation
Mention is also made of pseudonymisation as a technical and organisational tool
aimed at ensuring privacy. The concept of pseudonymisation consists in replacing all
identifiable elements by a pseudonym, thus hindering the direct identification of the
data  holder.  It  is  a  version  of  anonymisation  techniques  with  the  difference  that  it
produces anonymous data on an individual basis. If applied well, the data holder would
not be identifiable, and the data could be processed more freely. For example, the bike
users’ name could be pseudonymised and replaced by numbers and the retrieval of the
‘real’ name would require a key.
 Yet, as pointed out in Recital 26, personal data which has be pseudonymised “could
be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information”.
Pseudonymisation is therefore not an irreversible method and would still permit for
the data user to be identified, but is still considered as a functioning measure in order
to reduce the risks to the concerned data holders. Furthermore, by applying
pseudonymisation, the controller and the processor do more easily meet their data
protection obligations.
3. Data minimisation
Data minimisation is a considered as a privacy architecture by computer scientists,
and is strongly encouraged by the European Commission. As a matter of fact, data
minimisation is one of the core principles of the GDPR and requires that the personal
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data processed should be “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in
relation to the purposes for which they are processed” [article 5(c) GDPR].
In other words: where personal data is needed, make sure to process only what is
necessary. Föli should for example focus on processing only the name and the year of
birth, and not the marital status or the users’ nationality. By reducing the amount of
data collected, the controller diminishes the amount of data which is processed and
thus should be protected. Furthermore, it facilitates the application of anonymising
procedures, as the amount of data to anonymise is less. The more data, the more details
which can lead to reidentification. It is also to be noted that data minimisation goes
hand in hand with the requirement put on the controller in article 5 (2) to make sure
that no superfluous data is processed.
5.4.2 An obligation on controllers and IT designers?
The requirement for privacy by design presented in the GDPR under article 25
clearly puts an obligation on the controller. The controller becomes liable for ensuring
that privacy by design is implemented, as it is the controller who determines the means
of processing.
The notion of privacy by design, although aimed at the controller, indicates ‘design’.
Several scholars have therefore raised the question whether privacy by design also
should be an obligation aimed at the designers of the technologies processing the data.
Koops et al65, with reference to more literature, observe that “the ideal of the notion of
privacy by design […] could be read to be that all relevant data protection provisions
will be encoded in software or hardware to the greatest extent possible.” They decide
to name this ideal ‘hard privacy by design’, but quickly come to the conclusion that it
is in practice impossible, as the law is far too vague for technologies. Although some
specific legal provisions could benefit from some hard-coding, most of the legal
provisions and in particular the GDPR have very wide notions.  Just  considering the
fact that the article 25 of the GDPR is “taking into account the state of the art” of the
processing activites refers to the fact that they require flexibility, “breathing space”.
Technologies, albeit updateable, are usally designed and coded in a certain way.
65 See Koops et al, 2013
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Another hot debate is also to know whether privacy by design is a good solution at all,
considering that most of the existing data processing organisations do not have
designed security systems, and that becoming compliant with the article 25 could
require changes which might get very expensive66.
5.5 Personal Data Stores
Alongside the GDPR and all the national data protection laws, scholars have
attempted to develop an alternative way for protecting personal data in practice. The
idea of ‘Personal Data Stores’, also known as “Personal Information Management
Services” (PIMS), “MyData67”, “SelfData68”, “SmartData”, “Vendor Relationship
Management”, “Internet of Me”, is to empower the individuals with the control and
the management of their personal data. Cavoukian presents it69 as “SmartData consists
of autonomous, Internet-based agents that act as a data subject’s online surrogate –
securely storing personal information and intelligently disclosing it in accordance
with the user’s instructions.” The idea, which is “the embodiment of privacy by
design70”, is to allow the data to protect itself as it will be linked and protected by a
SmartData agent. Tomko71 vividly argues in favour of the implementation of
SmartData systems and stresses how secure the storage and the processing of the
personal data would be.
Personal data stores (PDS) are a way of rethinking data protection and changing the
control-centre. By giving the data subject control over her personal data, the PDS
system would enable full transparency both for the processing entity as well as for the
data subject and facilitate data management and liability issues.
In what way would it be different from our current data protection system?
66 See AvePoint blog, article Privacy and Security by Design: The New Default under GDPR”
67 Information available at: https://mydata.org/
68 Information available at: http://www.selfdata.tech/
69 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by design and the Promise of SmartData
70 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by design and the Promise of SmartData
71 G. Tomko, “SmartData: the Need, the Goal and the Challenge”
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5.5.1 Current data processing system
At present, personal data is transferred from data holder to companies without any
real control from either part. The authors of the new Regulation strive for a better
control of the personal data, by particularly giving it to the data holders. Yet, the data
is mostly in the hands of the processing companies, which need to take into account
loads of measures in order to respect the regulation.
Companies do for instance have a big responsibility in assuring the protection of the
personal data they are processing. To start with, they need to be aware of the fact that
they are processing personal data. This is not always an easy task, as the action of
“processing”, as shown in section 4.1.1, includes basically any action dealing with
personal data. They do also need to identify that they are using personal data, which
is, as presented in the introduction, any data which can lead to the identification of an
individual. Once the data has been categorized as personal data and the action has
been defined as processing of personal data, the company is to coordinate it all. The
meticulous organisation of the data has to be respected for two reasons: Firstly, the
company is liable for the good use of the data and should thus ensure that it is well
used for the right purpose in order to avoid any unlawful use of the data. In case of
breach, leak or use of data outside the purposes originally defined, the data holder
could call for a violation of the protection of their personal data. As defined previously
in this thesis72, this responsibility is provided in the article 24 of the GDPR, which
states that: “[…] the controller shall implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that processing is
performed in accordance with this Regulation. Those measures shall be reviewed and
updated where necessary.”
Second, the processing company should be well organized in order to enable the data
holder to use his rights provided by the GDPR, such as the right of access, the right to
data portability or the right to erasure. In order to ensure these rights, the company
should be able to quickly access the data subject’s data and follow his requests.
However, the “control” now given to the data subject might on the other hand seem
very blurry. In a society where technical tools are evolving rapidly and where digital
72 See section 3.2.2 under “the responsibility incumbent on the controller”
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data is being transferred at the speed of light, it requires from the data subject
organisational talents to keep control of the personal data concerning him. It appears
almost impossible to tell how many companies are processing my personal data right
now.  A few are  of  course  obvious,  others  less  so.  If  the  data  holder  does  not  know
where her data is processed, how could she possibly use her rights?
When using the services from different players from public service bodies and
organisation, such as hospitals and schools, as well as small and medium enterprises
to multinational corporations, access is given to our personal data. That is, because
personal data is provided to them by us, the data holders.
All these players process this personal data in the same way, by collecting it and
controlling it internally. In line with the GDPR’s requirement for the data subject to
access her data, the latter is only to get access to this data through the organisation in
question. For example, if the data holder wants to have access to her medical file, she
needs to contact the hospital which treated her. If the same person needs to manage
her theatre-visits, she needs to contact the theatre, and so on. Every single entity having
some of her personal data needs to get contacted and dealt with separately.
The current situation presents several disadvantages, starting with the number of
players involved. The Cambridge Report73 on PDS lists five different types of players
involved in the process of personal data:
1. “Multinational corporations, some of which derive revenue from data
monetisation, and others with more diverse revenue streams (e.g. Google vs.
Apple);
2. Small and medium enterprises (‘SMEs’);
3. Highly-regulated telecommunications companies, private healthcare
providers, financial institutions;
4. Public sector regulatory bodies;
5. Public sector organisations such as hospitals, schools, police departments and
passport issuing agencies.”
It is very likely that an average person has personal data in the database of every player
listed above. To manage this data, the data holder should go through all the players she
73 University of Cambridge Judge Business School, Personal Data Stores
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is involved with. Not without mentioning that all organisations most likely have
different parameters of access, which does not make the bureaucratic achievement
easier.
5.5.2 The new approach
The Personal Data Store (PDS) could change the present data management. In fact, the
control of personal data, which today is given to organisations and companies, would
be shifted to the data holders through PDS providers. From an ‘organisation-centric
personal data management’, it will become a ‘human-centric personal data
management’. The individuals would get control over their personal data. Finland has
been strong in developing the concept of Mydata, and have launched a ‘MyData
Alliance Finland74’, an open community aimed at boosting pilot PDS projects.
The Mydata logo illustrates well the idea of centralising the access to personal data,
where the data holding individual gets access to her educational, health, social media
data…
the MyData logo
A PDS system is by design giving the data holder the choice of the data she wants to
disclose and to what organisation she wants to make it  available.  Through the PDS
provider, she can explicitly give her consent to the sharing of the data she wants. The
data thus made available is usable by the receiving organisations. The public sector
could  for  instance  benefit  from  the  data  in  better  city  planning  and  smoother
coordination of public services.
All in all, a PDS system follows the principles held by the GDPR of assuring that the
data holders get control over their personal data.
74 See MyData Alliance Finland at https://mydatafi.wordpress.com/
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∂ Economic benefits
The benefits for the society could be several, starting with generated money in the
society. The Boston Consulting Group’s calculations75 assesses that €330 billion
annual economic benefit could be generated in Europe by 2020 if the PDS would
increase the flow of personal data. Ideally, the PDS ecosystem would enhance trust
and users would be more willing to share their personal data to businesses, which in
turn would benefit from accurate and profiled datasets.
∂ Convenience
PDS can answer to the behavioural paradox between control and convenience. As
analysed by the Cambridge report, some data holders would like to have a full control
over their data and to be the only ones to always decide on the collection of their data.
Some data subjects would however prefer and consider more convenient that websites
and services “remember” them. By enabling the data holder to set and manage their
own personal data store, its processing becomes tailored and individual.
5.5.3 In practice
In practice, the PDS system requires to be hosted. The host could be an independent
PDS manager, or the whole system could be self-hosted. As the name implies it, a PDS
requires a storage, a place where the personal data can be gathered. Additionally, it
requires a platform through which the individual can access and grant access to her
personal  data.   It  goes  without  saying  that  these  technical  requirements  need  to  be
safely secured.
Tomko describes76 the security infrastructure of the SmartData initiative as being
based on “stripping a user’s personal ID from the body of his/her data. The
anonymized data is then segmented, encrypted, and placed in digital “lock-boxes”.”
The SmartData is thus relying on anonymization techniques, encryption and safe
storage, all methods combined. Although, as shown earlier in this section,
anonymization techniques all present risks of reidentification, the protection should
logically only get stronger when assimilated to other security measures.
75 Boston Consulting Group, The Value of our Digital Identity, 2012
76 G. Tomko, “SmartData: The Need, the Goal and the Challenge”
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5.5.4 PDS and Föli
As presented in the introduction, Föli is one of the branches of the city of Turku among
other public activities such as health care, libraries, schools… If personal data stores
were to be implemented in Turku, it would be worth including all the activities carried
out by Turku. It would thus enable the Turku-residents to have an overview of all the
public activities processing their data or requesting accessing to them. The first steps
towards such an approach have already been launched with the “Smart and Wise
Turku” project in May 2018.
Data protection is not only a set of legal rules. Technical solutions are required
to ensure that the strings of data are securely collected, stored and transferred and for
that end, several techniques exist. Anonymisation, encryption and privacy by design
are all solutions approved by the GDPR without providing instructions on how to
implement them. Personal Data Stores are a novel method in the continuation of the
Privacy by Design dynamic which could provide with a complete security for solutions
by changing the core control over the personal data.
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CONCLUSION
Turku is one of the few cities in Finland to have adopted a city bike service, together
with Helsinki and Espoo. This new feature makes the city of Turku attractive, easily
discoverable, eco-friendly and smart, or as the Finns say fiksu kaupunki77.
Yet, as smart as the city might become, the administrative steps to take before
implementing the system and during its maintenance might not be considered that
‘smart’ and easy, especially when the new general data protection regulation is
enforceable on May 25th, 2018. As a matter of fact, as the date is approaching and the
shadow of 20 million euros in penalty is floating in case of non-compliance, companies
and organisations are afraid. That is at least the echo media have been giving out in
the past few months, as when the French Le Monde writes that ‘the GDPR is haunting
the French employers78’, or when the Swedish Dagens Nyheter title their article79 “the
abbreviation which might cost companies millions in penalty” with regard to the
GDPR. With such titles, it feels like encouragements to panic. But is it necessary?
Föli is in a rather comfortable seat regarding the city bikes as the whole system is new:
this implies that all the processing activities are freshly designed and therefore might
be easily adjusted. A new service also implies new contracts with processors, and
possibilities  to  include  in  these  contracts  and  in  the  terms  and  conditions  all  the
necessary information required by the regulation. That is comfortable compared to
companies which have been processing personal data in the course of their business
and which already have subcontractors: for them, the process of getting in compliance
with  the  GDPR  might  then  be  more  demanding.  All  the  personal  data  has  to  get
secured, if that is not the case; new contracts have to be drafted; liability has to be
77 Finnish for ’Smart city’
78 See the article in French, « Protection des données : le texte européen qui hante les nuits des patrons
de PME français », Le Monde, 8.05.2018, available at :
https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2018/05/08/protection-des-donnees-un-casse-tete-pour-les-
entreprises_5295916_3234.html?xtmc=rgpd&xtcr=2 . The English title is my own translation.
79 See the article in Swedish, ”Förkortningen som kan kosta företag miljonböter”, Dagens Nyheter,
06.02.2018, available at: https://www.dn.se/arkiv/ekonomi/forkortningen-som-kan-kosta-foretag-
miljonboter/  The English title is my own translation.
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defined; technical tools might need to get updated; some personal data might even
need to cease being collected… In other words, the GDPR comes along with a lot of
work!
This thesis is an attempt to identify the necessary work to be done by Föli regarding
data protection, both legally and technically. It feels obsolete to consider law on its
own, especially when a text like the GDPR comes along and requires technical tools
to be implemented and updated. Technology and law have never been that linked than
when digitalisation started spreading, and the legal community is well aware of it. As
a matter of fact, the GDPR gets enforceable together with the ePrivacy regulation,
replacing the previous Directive 2002/58/EC and aiming at regulating personal data in
electronic communications. Both texts include digital technology as an important part.
Föli’s city bikes are very much depending on digital technologies, especially as their
billing system is partly using smartphone as a device, and each bike is equipped with
a GPS. Furthermore, all collected personal data is stored in a physical server, and all
communications with the users is for the moment made through emails. As required
by the GDPR, all personal data has to be secured, and as a consequence it leads to
secure the technical tools used for its processing. It is as if personal data was water
which needs to be held within a bag, the bag representing technologies. For the water
to stay inside the bag, the latter needs to be whole and without holes. The same goes
for the whole technical system, which needs to be updated regularly by IT experts as
to make sure that personal data cannot leak out.
Technical tools also encompass all the security procedures such as encryption,
anonymization and privacy by design. If personal data stores come to get considered
as a viable solution, they might come to be considered as embedded technical tools
too. Lessig wants us to learn that “technology is plastic [which] can be remade to do
things differently80”, and that code, read ‘technology’, could become a regulator
assisting  in  the  protection  of  personal  data.  Lessig  believes  that  “there are both
changes in law and changes in technology that could produce a much more private
(and secure) digital environment.”
80 L.Lessig, Code 2.0, in the chapter ‘is-ism’
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Protected against what? As described in a non-exhaustive list in the second part of this
thesis, the threats to personal data are several and could evolve, as new methods of
hacking get developed. If personal data is considered as “the future’s fuel”, why
wouldn’t it be attractive to wrong-doers to find profit in hacking it and selling it? The
risk of hacking through vulnerable sensors or unprotected Internet connections is
measurable and can be limited, by for example securing all the used technologies and
updating them regularly. Security is also achieved through measures such as
encryption, safe storages and anonymization techniques. However, these risks also
have an effect on psychology, as Schneier argues81. According to him, security is both
a “a feeling and a reality”, the reality being measurable, and the feeling being subject
to psychological reactions to the calculated risks and the countermeasures put in place.
In other words, we might feel truly secure when in fact the risks are terrible, and on
the contrary we might feel threatened although everything is safe. Where is the
balance? Scientific studies in psychology and behavioural finance have analysed this
balance and the reasons for unbalance, and it seems that the GDPR’s answer to this is
to give the data user control.
It  will  not  be  stated  enough:  giving  control  to  the  data  user  is  what  the  GDPR was
designed for. This control is made possible through the several rights given to the data
holder, namely the right to access, the right to rectification, the right to erasure, right
to data portability, the right to restriction of processing and the right to object. The two
last ones were not analysed in this thesis as they were not considered applicable in the
case of Föli’s city bike system. Having those rights, the data subject should be able to
have an overview over her data in the processing system.
Guaranteeing these rights do however put quite a lot of pressure on the processing
organisations, as they both should secure legally and technically the collected personal
data, and have great organisational skills that one may retrieve a specific string of data.
Yet again, Föli is in a favourable position as the bike system is new, and the bike user
registry is easily organisable from the beginning. They should nonetheless ensure that
81 Schneier, The Psychology of Security (Part 1), from the Blog Schneier on Security, 2008
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all collected personal data has been subject to the data holder’s consent and that it is
being processed in a transparent way and with a well-defined purpose.
What happens in case of failure, if personal data is breached?  Covered by the article
33 and 34 GDPR, the controller shall without undue delay inform the supervisory
authority of the breach, and in the case that the breach is “likely to result in a high risk
to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”, the data holder should be kept
informed.  The  GDPR  recital  specifies  that  reprimands  might  be  given  by  the
supervisory authority or fines, and administrative fines might be imposed in case of
severe breach. The amount would depend on the circumstances of the breach, for
instance on the “nature, gravity and duration of the infringement and of its
consequences and the measures taken […] to prevent or mitigate the consequences of
the infringement.” The general conditions for imposing the administrative fines are
defined in the article 83 GDPR, and the dissuasive fines of 20 million euros or 4% of
the total worldwide annual turnover are charged:
- If  the basic principles of processing and of the consent mechanism were not
respected,
- If the data subject’s rights were not respected,
- If personal data was unduly transferred or,
- If the controller did not comply with an order from the supervisory authority.
However, one paragraph worth reflecting on is article 83(7) which states that “[…]
each member state lay down the rules on whether and to what extent administrative
fines may be imposed on public authorities and bodies established in that Member
State.” As explained in the introduction, Turku’s city bike system is currently operated
by the city of Turku but will be shifted completely to Föli in a few years. Meaningless
to say that the city of Turku is a public authority, Föli is also a public transport service,
subject to national rules regarding administrative fines. It is thus interesting to read the
Finnish proposal82 for a national law, which aims at completing the GDPR in all the
82 In Finnish Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle EU:n yleistä tietosuoja-asetusta täydentäväksi
lainsäädännöksi, available at: http://valtioneuvosto.fi/paatokset/paatos?decisionId=0900908f80595905
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provisions requiring transposition into national law. Its article 25 83 requires for
instance that public authorities and bodies should not be subject to administrative fines,
as it would be like paying a fine from the State to the State. In other words, Föli would
thus not be subject to fines, however does this take away the aspect of liability? Are
Föli, as the main controller, still responsible for possible data protection breaches? The
answer to this is that public authorities and bodies are subject to other rules and a right
processing of personal data belongs to their duty, and severe sanctions could be borne
if this duty was violated, as mentioned in the proposal’s explanation of the article 25.
However,  how  does  it  go  with  processors,  which  are  all  private  actors?  Init,  Nets,
Globeon, Western Systems and Nextbike Polska S.A are private organisations and
therefore should bear administrative sanctions in case of personal data breaches.  These
sanctions would however not be charged on Föli, thus a separate penalty mechanism
would be put in place appreciating the two different qualities of the actors involved.
This new legal situation is likely to be resolved with time, as many other aspects in the
data protection field.
83 Article 25(2) in Finnish: ”Seuraamusmaksua ei voida määrätä valtion viranomaisille, valtion
liikelaitoksille, kunnallisille viranomaisille, itsenäisille julkisoikeudellisille laitoksille, eduskunnan
virastoille eikä tasavallan presidentin kanslialle.”
